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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE
STATE OF UTAH
KATHLEEN CLONTZ,

I

Plaintiff/Respondent

/

vs.

/

HARVEY CLONTZ,

/

Case No.

Defendant/Appellant/Petitioner

/

Priority No. 13

PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI

/

STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
QUESTION NO. 1
The

trial

court's

non-award

of

alimony

to

the

defendant, and the Court of Appeals confirmation of this
Order is a manifest injustice contrary to Sections 30-3-5 of
the Utah Code Annotated, (1953) as amended and constitutes
an abuse of discretion.

Other Appellate decisions appear to

be in conflict with this decision, in that the appellate
court has upheld awards of alimony in the same circumstances
that Petitioner is in.

It is the Petitioner's position that

the contrary, (upholding a non-award) would be an abuse of
discretion.
QUESTION NO. 2
The

trial

court's

distribution

of

the

plaintiff's

retirement found, that being that the Petitioner was not
awarded any of the plaintiff's government retirement and the
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Appellate

Court

affirmation

of

this

distribution,

is

a

manifest injustice and contrary to other appellate holdings
where the Court of Appeals found that retirement funds are a
marital asset and should be subject to division.

CITATION OF RELEVANT CASE LAW OF OPINIONS RENDERED BY THE
COURT OF APPEALS
Boyle v. Boyle, 55 Utah Adv. Rep. 51, (April 15,
1987).
Eames v. Eames, 55, Utah Adv Rep 49, (April 9, 1987)
Petersen v. Peterson, 58 Ut. Ad. Rep. 28, (May 18, 1987)
Rayburn v. Rayburn, 59 Utah Adv Rep 42, (May 29, 1987).
Talley v. Talley, 61 Ut. Ad. Rep, 31, (July 2, 1987).
Lee v. Lee, 69 Utah Adv. Rep. 51,

(November 10, 1987).

Canning v. Canning 68 Ut. Ad. Rep. 16, (October
16, 1987).
Claus v. Claus

727 P.2d 184 (Utah, 1986)

Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah, 1986)
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY
This petition for a Writ of Certiorari is being sought
pursuant to the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Title VI,
JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO COURT OF APPEALS, Rule
42 and 43.
The Court of Appeals affirmation of the trial court
judgment was filed on October 16, 1987, and an extension for
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Enlargement of Time, was filed and entered on November 13,
1987, thus enlarging the time for filing of this Petition
for Writ to December 16, 1987.
It is believed that Rule 43 (1) , (2) , and (3) confer the
review of the appellate court decision upon the Utah Supreme
Court.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
Utah

Code

Annotated,

Sections

30-3-5,(1953)

as

amended.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This

is

a

complaint

by

plaintiff /respondent

and

an

answer and counterclaim, by defendant/appellant/petitioner,
each

seeking

distribution

a
of

decree
property

of

divorce

and

an

equitable

and

alimony

rights.

Plaintiff

alleged in her complaint, and defendant in his answer and
counterclaim, that each treated the other cruelly, causing
mental anguish and distress.
The Honorable David E. Roth, on March 25, 1986, sitting
without a jury, granted plaintiff a decree of divorce based
upon

the grounds

of mental

cruelty.

The District

Court

entered an Order regarding the distribution of property and
defendant's rights to an alimony award.
This Order was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court on
August 19, 1986.

This case was then transferred to the Utah
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Court of Appeals and the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's decision on October 16, 1987.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Plaintiff and Defendant were married on the 7th day of
March,

1959, in Sunset, Davis County, Utah.

There

have

been five (5) children born as issue of this marriage, but
all children are now emancipated. (TR 106)
Plaintiff is employed at Hill Air Force Base and her
gross income is over Two thousand dollars
month. (TR 103)

($2,000.00) per

Plaintiff has accumulated Fifteen thousand

eight hundred fifty-six dollars and eighty-three cents
($15,856.83) in retirement. (TR 106)
Defendant

is

medically

disabled

and

receives

Civil

Service disability in the amount of Six Hundred Fifty-Five
dollars and forty-eight cents ($655.48) per month and has no
other source of income. (TR 106)
That in 1960 a home was built by the parties upon
property given to the defendant.
unencumbered

and

the

appraised

Presently, the property is
value

of

the property

is

sixty-one thousand five hundred dollars ($61,500.00). (TR 96
to 108)

The appraised value of the land itself is Sixteen

thousand dollars ($16,000.00).
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(TR 117)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is defendant/petitioner's position that the trial
court

abused

Annotated,

its discretion

Section

30-3-5.

contrary
Defendant

to the Utah Code
was

not

awarded

alimony nor a portion of plaintiff's retirement fund which
would have been equitable in view of defendant's financial
situation and the length of the parties1 marriage. When the
effect of the inequity is combined with the payment of the
Court awarded equity in the sum of Twenty three thousand,
five hundred ($23,500.00) dollars to plaintiff within six
(6) months

from the date of the Order, the effect is

evaluated and this abuse of discretion rises to a level
requiring a modification of the trial court's order to
insure that a manifest injustice does not occur.
The Utah Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's
Order and the defendant/appellant is petitioning the Utah
Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari.

This Petition is

brought pursuant to several recent opinions by the Utah
Court of Appeals which appear to be in conflict with the
decision issued in this case, as well as prior Supreme Court
holding, thus invoking a review of this matter pursuant to
Rule 43, (1),(2), and (3) of the Utah Supreme Court Rules of
Procedure.
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ARGUMENT
Point I
RECENT OPINIONS BY THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ARE
IN CONFLICT WITH THE DECISION RENDERED IN THE
INSTANT CASE, AND ALSO WITH PRIOR OPINIONS
RENDERED BY THIS COURT.
In

the

case

any alimony.

at

hand,

petitioner

was

not

awarded

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

recognize that the petitioner receives approximately six
hundred and fifty dollars ($650.00) per month in disability
income.

The Findings also indicate that the Plaintiff is

employed and in the trial transcript it is indicated that
she earns over two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) per month.
There

was

also

testimony

regarding

the

defendant/petitioner's ill health, his lack of a job, and
that his expenses were over one thousand dollars ($1,000.00)
per month.

Despite the fact that the defendant/petitioner

had been medically disabled since 1977, the trial court
indicated that if he needed more money "he would have to go
out and find a job".

It is evident from the record that the

trial court realized that the defendant could not meet his
expenses

without

additional

income.

This

abuse

of

discretion arises because alimony was not granted at least
until the defendant/petitioner could secure employment to
help meet his financial obligations.

- 6 -

In a recent decision, this Court

found no abuse of

discretion where alimony had been provided to "cushion" the
recipient spouse until a return to a self-sustaining status,
Claus v. Claus, 727 P.2d 184 (1987)

Also in another matter,

the Court found that an award of only one hundred ($100.00)
dollars per month alimony was an abuse of discretion because
if would not afford the wife a standard of living close to
the standard of living enjoyed by the parties during the
marriage.
gross

This was a thirty-year marriage and the husband's

income

fifty-six

was

dollars

twenty
and

four

eighty/100

thousand,

three

($$24,356.80)

hundred

per year.

The Court found that the husband had the ability to provide
permanent support in the amount greater than one hundred
dollars ($100.00) per month, and secondly, this Court found
that although a defendant does have another source of income
besides plaintiff's salary, the fact that the divorced wife
has some property or other means to support herself should
not preclude an allowance of alimony if the husband has far
superior resources. Frank v. Frank 58 P.2d 453 (Utah, 1978) .
A recent appellate decision, Peterson v. Peterson, 58
Utah Advance Reporter 28 (1987) , affirmed alimony awarded by
the trial court.

The parties had been married since 1963,
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the husband a doctor and the wife a school teacher, although
she

had

not

worked

in

some

time.

The

appellate

court

considered the wife's previous lifestyle and the fact that
she now

had

to make mortgage

expenses

such as

payments

and

pay

ordinary

food, clothing, and transportation, and

lastly they considered that she had no outside income.
its decision, the Court of Appeals considered

In

the wife's

ability to provide sufficient income and that this income
would probably be only one-fourth of her husbands.

However,

most importantly, the Court of Appeals mentioned

that it

would be unreasonable to assume that she would immediately
be able to enter the job market and support herself in a
style which she had been living before the divorce.
The

Peterson

case

is

analogous

to

the

defendant/petitioner's case because now he needs to go out
into the job market and pay for all the ordinary expenses of
every day life and the evidence in the trial record that he
could -not do this indicates an abuse of discretion by the
trial court when alimony was not awarded.
Also, in Talley v. Talley 61 Utah Advance Report, 31
(1987) ,

the

over

court

again

The Talley1s were married

alimony.
years.

appellate

upheld

an

award

for approximately

of
15

At the time of the divorce, the plaintiff-wife net

nine

hundred

and

fifty-three
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dollars

($953.00)

per

month, while the defendant-husband net over two thousand
dollars ($2,000.00) per month.

The appellate court awarded

alimony of two hundred and fifty dollars ($250.00) per month
for two years and one hundred and fifty dollars ($150.00)
per month for three years to the plaintiff-wife.

The Court

of Appeals indicated that they had considered the required
factors outlined in Eames v. Eames 55, Utah Advance Report
49,

(1957) and

discretion.

But

found

that

again,

in

there was
the

not

an

defendant's

abuse of
case,

the

defendant was married for 27 years as opposed to the Talley
15 year marriage; that a despairity in the incomes are
present because the husband in Talley makes approximately
the

same

amount

defendant/petitioner's

of

money

wife

and

per

month

as

defendant/petitioner

making less than the wife in Talley.

the
is

Interestingly however,

the appellate court affirmed the trial court's Order in
Talley, but not in the defendant/petitioner's case.
The Court of Appeals mentions the Eames in several
different

opinions.

The Court of Appeals mentions the

factors to consider in awards of alimony are:
"... 1. The financial condition and needs
of the spouse claiming support.
2. The ability of that spouse to provide
sufficient income for him or her self, and
3. The ability of the responding spouse
to provide the support..."
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The Court of Appeals affirmed the award of alimony in
Eames,

The facts of this case are that the parties were

married for 30 years and had three grown children.

The

plaintiff-wife grossed approximately ten thousand dollars
($10,000.00) per year
income

was

and

approximately

($34,000.00)

per

year.

the defendant-husband's
thirty

four

Plaintiff

was

thousand

gross

dollars

to receive three

hundred dollars ($300.00) of alimony per month until she was
65 years of age.

Because the above factors were set forth

in the Findings of Fact,
abuse of discretion.

the Court of Appeals found no

However, it is interesting to note, in

Judge Orme's decision

(which was dissenting in part but

affirming as to alimony) points out that the defendant's
major gripe in Eames is that he did not think any alimony
should be awarded because his former wife was able-bodied
and gainfully employed and the Judge further indicates that
he found that the alimony awarded by the trial court was on
the low-ebb of what was appropriate under the doctrine
reiterated Paffel v. Paffel 48 Utah Advance Report 12 (1986)
in view of the parties ages and education as well as the
length

of

incomes.

their marriage

and

substantial

despairity

in

Again, this is the defendant/petitioner's case
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exactly

on

point.

A

dispairity in incomes.

long

marriage

and

a

substantial

Still, the Court of Appeals upheld

the trial court's judgment.
It would not be fair to omit Boyle v. Boyle 55 Utah
Advance Reporter 51 (1987) , a case wherein the appellate
court affirmed a decision of a non award of alimony to a
plaintiff-wife.

However, it is easy to see the difference

in Boyle and the defendant/petitioner's matter.
7 year marriage with no children.

This was a

The trial court refused

the plaintiff-wife's request to include a finding that she
was unable to work, but did find that "the marriage was not
a long term marriage, and that each party was restored to
the condition each was in at the time of the marriage, and
therefore no alimony should be awarded."

But, the Court of

Appeals did recognize that the purpose of the alimony is to
equalize the standard of living for both spouses, and to
maintain them at their present standard as much as possible.
In Boyle the appellate court found that the trial court
properly considered the length of the marriage, and the
recipient spouse's employability but most importantly, the
appellate court found that the plaintiff-wife had previously
received several months of temporary alimony to give her an
opportunity to rehabilitate.

In the defendant/petitioner's
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case, he did not receive any type of alimony to rehabilitate
himself or even to help him along until he did find the
employment which he needs to make ends meet as the trial
court well realized.
Also, on the other side of the coin, in Lee v. Lee

69

Utah Advance Reporters 51 (1987) the wife appealed because
she was awarded only one dollar ($1,00) of alimony per year.
The parties were married for 9 years.
The Court of Appeals again cited the three factors in
Eames and stated that after careful review of the records
there was no explanation for the one dollar ($1.00) per year
award.

The Court of Appeals stated that the wife, at that

time was unemployed, and despite looking for work she must
incur the expense of moving a mobile home that she was
awarded in the divorce and in addition to ordinary living
expenses.

The husband in Lee earned approximately eighteen

hundred dollars ($1,800.00) per month and the trial court
record indicates that his income had been declining..

The

appellate court remanded this case to the trial court to fix
alimony in light of the three factors articulated in Eames.
It is evident that in defendant/petitioner's case, that
the appellate court did not consider the factor one (1) of
Eames; the financial condition and the needs of the spouse
claiming support.

In this case, the facts show that the
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husband, defendant/petitoner, although possibly could work,
had not found work at that time and the trial court did not
award him any alimony to keep him until he was able to find
employment.
Again, in Canning v. Canning 68 Utah Advance Report 16,
(1987) , the

appellate

court

found

that

a

non-award

of

alimony was clear abuse of discretion because the record did
not

reveal

that

the

trial

court

considered

or made

any

findings of the wife's current or future ability to work.
The

Court

of

Appeals

indicated

that

the

trial

record

contemplated that the plaintiff would obtain work and earn
income sufficient to support herself, but pointed out that
there were

specific

findings

and

she

is

left without a

remedy if she does not find work.

This case is identical to

the defendant/petitioner's case.

What becomes of him if he

is unable to secure employment?
Point II
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISTRIBUTION OF THE PLAINTIFF'S
RETIREMENT MANIFESTS INJUSTICE CONTRARY TO SECTION
30-35-5 OF THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953) AND
CONSISTS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
THE COURT OF
APPEALS AFFIRMATION
OF THIS DISTRIBUTION
IS
CONTRARY TO OTHER APPELLATE HOLDINGS WHERE THE
COURT OF APPEALS FOUND THAT RETIREMENT FUNDS ARE
MARITAL ASSETS AND SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO DIVISION
In

this

divorce

action,

the

trial

court

did

not

consider plaintiff's retirement fund as a marital asset to
be divided between the parties.
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This is in direct conflict

with this Courts, in Dogu v. Dogu, 62 P. 2d 1308 (Utah,
1982), the Court cited Englert v. Englert, 576 Pacific 2nd
1279, Utah (1978), and held that the trial courts duty to
make an equitable division of property in a divorce action:
".•.encompasses all of the assets of every nature
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and
from whatever source derived; and that this
includes any such pension fund or insurance."
The

trial

court

should

have

awarded

a portion of

plaintiff's retirement to the defendant as a marital asset,
although

plaintiff

is

not

yet

retired

and

her

actual

enjoyment of this benefit is purely prospective.
The trial court found that the value of plaintifffs
retirement

is

fifteen

thousand

dollars and eighty-three cents

eight

hundred

($15,856.83).

fifty-six
It is the

defendant/petitioner's contention that he should be entitled
to one-half of this amount and that the equitable thing to
do would have been to award the defendant/petitioner his
share of plaintiff's retirement benefits and off-set this
amount

against

plaintiff's

share

of

determined equity of the marital home.

the

trial

court's

In several appellate

court decisions, particularly in Marchant v. Marchant, 6 6
Utah Advanced Reports, 45 (1987), the Court of Appeals held
that retirement funds were a marital asset and also quoted
Englert.

Although the emphasis in Marchant is the way the

asset is divided, the defendant/petitioner in the instant
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case has no problem with the division, only the lack of
division, hence different types of division will not be
discussed here.
Again, in Bailey v, Bailey, 70 Utah Advance Reports 20,
(1987) ,

the

retirement

fund.

distribution
remanded

appellate
Again,

and

for

court

not

the

the

upheld
issue

the actual

trial

court

a
in

division
Bailey

award.
to

This

consider

of

was

a

the

case was

the

proper

division.
In Rayburn v. Rayburn 59 Utah Advance Reports 42 (1987)
a trial court distributed a retirement fund between the
husband and wife.

The appellate court accepted the trial

courtfs finding of the retirement funds present value and
found

no

abuse

of

discretion

in

court's

awarding

the

plaintiff one-half interest in the retirement fund.
In

the

trial

court's

summation

in

the

defendant/petitioner's matter, the trial court appeared to
find

that

defendant's

right

to

receive

civil

service

disability income off-sets his entitlement to plaintiff's
retirement as a marital asset.

The flaw in this reasoning

is the fact that defendant's right to receive his disability
income would be most appropriately considered monthly income
as he is only entitled to this benefit as long as he is
disabled.

Further, the defendant/petitioner is not accruing
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any retirement benefit while receiving this civil service
disability.

He has no retirement fund which is growing as

he receives this income, as the plaintiff does.
Lastly, the trial court found that the plaintiff's
right to receive disability income has a value of "upwards
around fifty thousand dollars

($50,000.00)", further, the

trial court indicated that it would not charge defendant
this valued amount and would off-set the parties rights to
each other's retirements.

Again, this reasoning

is not

accurate because the plaintiff is earning three (3) times
what the defendant is earning and accruing a retirement at
the same time.
one-half

It would take defendant/petitioner six and

years

($50,000.00)

and

to

receive

the

trial

fifty
court

has

thousand
not

dollars

taken

into

consideration what would happen if he was no longer able to
receive the disability income. (The plaintiff would have
earned more than One Hundred Fifty Thousand

($150,000.00)

Dollars during this time .as well as accrued additional
retirement benefits on top of that).

CONCLUSION
This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is submitted to
the Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 42 and 43, in that the
decision of the appealed Court of Appeals appears to be in
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conflict with their other holdings and also holdings of this
Court when affirming the decision of the trial court.

It is

respectfully requested that this matter be reviewed by the
Utah Supreme Court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

//t*L

day of December,

1987.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct
copies

of

the

foregoing

plaintiff/Respondent's

Writ

of

Certiorari

to

attorney, PETE N. VLAHOS, at Legal

Forum Building, 2447 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401 on
this

the

Z*1/ day of December, 1987.
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§30-3-5.
U.C.A.
Disposition of property - Maintenance and healthcare of
parties
and
children
- Court
to have
continuing
jurisdiction - Custody and visitation - Termination of
alimony - Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1)
include

When
in

a decree

it

of

equitable

property, and parties.

divorce
orders

is

rendered,

relating

to

the

court

the

may

children,

The Court shall include the following in

every decree of divorce:
(a)

an order assigning responsibility

of reasonable

and necessary medical

for the payment

and dental expenses

of

the dependent children; and
(b)

if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an

order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate
health, hospital, and dental care insurance to the dependent
children,
(2)

The. court may

include,-

in an

order

determining

child

support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a
portion

of

child

care

expenses

incurred

on

behalf

of

the

dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of
the

custodial

circumstances

parent.
are

appropriate

would be adequately
the

non-custodial

If

cared
parent

the
and

court
that

for, it may
to

provide

determines
the

dependent

include an order
the

day

care

that

the

children
allowing
for

the

dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of
the custodial parent.
(3)

The

court

has

continuing

jurisdiction

to

make

subsequent changes or new orders for the support and maintenance
of the parties, the custody

of

the children

and

their

support,

maintenance, health, and dental care, or the distribution of the
property as is reasonable and necessary.
(4)

In

determing

grandparents, and other

visitation

rights

of

parents,

relatives, the court shall consider

the

welfare of the child.
(5)

Unless

a

decree

of

divorce

specifically

provides

otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a
former

spouse

that former
found
the

automatically

spouse.

to be void

party

paying

terminates

However, if

upon

the

the remarriage

is annulled

ab initio, payment of alimony
alimony

is

made

a

party

remarriage

and

shall resume

to

the

of

action

if
of

annulment and his rights are determined.
(6)
former

Any order of the court that a party

pay

alimony

spouse terminates upon establishment by the party

to a

paying

alimony that the former spouse is residing with a person of the
opposite

sex.

However,

if

it

is

further

established

by

the

person receiving alimony that that relationship or association is
without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
(7)
visitation

When

a petition

provisions

for modification

of a court order

of child

custody

is made and denied,

or
the

court may order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorney's
fees expended

by

court determines

the prevailing
that

asserted in good faith.

party

in that action, if the

the petition was without

merit

and

not

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

Kathleen Clontz,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

v.
Case No. 860200-CA

Harvey James Clontz,
Defendant and Appellant.

Before Judges Davidson, Bench and Orme (On Rule 31 Hearing)

Pursuant to Rule 31 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals,
the judgment of the Second District Court in the above-captioned
appeal is affirmed.

DATED this

day of October, 1987.
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2447 Kiesel Avenue
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL

DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER

COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

KATHLEEN

CLONTZ,

/

Plaintiff,
vs .

/

HARVEY JAMES C L O N T Z ,

/

Defendant.

/

This

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

/

matter

having

come

Civil

on

No. 92534

regularly

for

trial

25th day of M a r c h , 1 9 8 6 , before the Honorable David
one of
out

a

the Judges
jury, and

of the
the

above entitled

Plaintiff

on

E. Roth,,

Court sitting

appearing

in person

the

with-

and

with

her a t t o r n e y , Pete N. V l a h o s , and the Defendant appearing

in

person

and

it

having

been

copy
the

with
shown

his

that

of a Complaint
Defendant

attorney,

filed

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

the

and
his

John

Blair

Defendant

a copy

of

responsive

H u t c h i s o n , and

was duly served with a

the

S u m m o n s , and

pleadings,

and

wherein
each

of

the

parties

behalf,

having

proffers

been

of proof

chambers concerning
offered

sworn

and testifying

having

several

been

made

to the Court in

i t e m s , that e x h i b i t s having

and r e c e i v e d , and the Court being

all m a t t e r s p e r t a i n i n g

in their own

been

fully c o g n i z a n t of

t h e r e i n , enters the f o l l o w i n g :
F I N D I N G S OF FACT

1.
State

That P l a i n t i f f

of

Utah

for at

c o m m e n c e m e n t of this
2.

•\

-y

>>

>
<...J
H

o
ZUJr_j Z -35Ui=6

< a < i

Sunset,
said

That
Utah

time

has been a resident o ^ Weber
least

three

(3) months

County,

prior

to the

action.

Plaintiff

and

Defendant

on the 7th day of M a r c h ,

have

been

and still

been

born

were

married

1 9 5 9 , and ever

are husband

and w i f e ;

in

since
that

'J)

UJ cc co ->
"•V*> z o y z
a: ^ * ui
z o

< ^t O

there

has

children,

and

that

as
all

issue
five

of

this

marriage

(5) c h i l d r e n

five

(5)

are now e m a n c i -

pated.
3.
ly,

That the D e f e n d a n t has treated

causing

the

her great

Defendant

Plaintiff,

has

mental

been

and that

distress

argumentative,

the P l a i n t i f f

the P l a i n t i f f cruel-,
and a n g u i s h ,
has

in that

threatened

is fearful

the

of the D e f e n -

dant.
4.
herein
West

That during
have

2700

acquired

South

the course of the m a r r i a g e , the parties
at

3867

in S y r a c u s e , U t a h , and the Court finds

that

F I N D I N G S OF FACT AND
C O N C L U S I O N S OF LAW

an

equity

in a home

located

the land and home have a value of $ 6 1 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 ; that the
finds

that

traced,
value

the

and

of

at

land

was

the

time

$600.00,

$16,000.00,

but

ment on the

land.

5.
age,

That

have

exhibit

that

there

the

given
of

present

been

personal

introduced

Defendant
back

value

the

property

of

in C o u r t , and

course
as

and

the

land

of

of

be

is

improve-

the

evidenced

in a d d i t i o n , the

has a 1983 Mercury a u t o m o b i l e , which

can

in 1 9 6 2 , had a

$ 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 worth

p a r t i e s , during

acquired

the

the giving

the

has

to

Court

ferriby

the

Plaintiff

has a fair market

value

of $ 7 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 , with a mortgage balance of $ 3 , 1 0 0 . 0 0 , having a
net

equity

of $ 4 , 4 0 0 . 0 0 ; that

the

4x4

truck

having

$10,000.00,

balance
that

of

the

parties

value

$7,63 2.00,

Plaintiff

6.

has

an

equity

purchased

a

incurred

$ 1 8 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 due

mortgage

$2,368.00;

and

home

the

since

and

the course of the m a r r i a g e , the
certain

owing

on

debts,
the

to-wit:

1983

the
and

owing

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
C O N C L U S I O N S OF LAW

Mercury
on

the

3

parties

Approximately

trailer Plaintiff

owing

due

of

a

GMC

that the mobile home has an equity of.

separated, approximately

$7,632.00

with

mobile

since the parties
on

has a 1985

$300.00.

That during
have

of

leaving

separated, and

approximately

herein

a

Defendant

purchased

$3,100.00 due and

automobile,

approximately

1985 GMC t r u c k , and that

the

parties

have

incurred

debts

and

obligations

since

they

separated.

Base

7.

That

and

has

sently

the
a

Plaintiff

is

retirement;

retired

and

employed

and

receives

that

income

at

the

receive
that

and

the

the

the

present

retirement

Plaintiff

value

is

has

far

vested;

if a present value was placed
it would

be s o m e w h e r e around

8.
able,
that

That

in
he

Court

f a c t , the

9.

if

he

That during
have

also

pre-

ri g < 11 to

the Defendant's
excess

that

of

the

$15,000.00

the Court believes

that

retirement

$50,000.00.

finds

looking

needs

is

retirement of the

on the D e f e n d a n t ' s

Defendant

is presently

employment

herein

the

Force

in excess of $ 6 5 0 . 0 0 per

of
in

Air

Defendant

m o n t h , and the Court finds that the vested
Plaintiff

Hill

more

that

the D e f e n d a n t

is e m p l o y -

has

been employed

in the p a s t ,

for

work and will

have to find

than

the

$650.00

retirement.

the course of the m a r r i a g e , the parties,

acquired

thirteen

(13)

$25.00

face

value

U.S. Savings B o n d s .
10.
submitted
which

are

That

the

lists

showing

drastically

drastic d i f f e r e n c e
that

Court

Plaintiff

finds

that

each

the

value

of

different

in

in the d i a m o n d s

h a s , and

F I N D I N G S OF FACT AND
C O N C L U S I O N S OF LAW

the

Court

4

of

the

items

valuation,

parties
of

property,

including

and m i s c e l l a n e o u s
finds

that

has

the

jewelry

the value

of

Plaintiff's
dant's

jewelry

guns,

$700.00

That

12.

real

the

and

also

that

that

is not a marital
account

in

his

a joint

a s s e t , and
name,

which

to

by the

that

the

be

$600.00

those

in comparing

appears

finds

is about

concerning

set requested

Court

has

there

side

finds

item

television
That

finds

each

Court

to the value of the Defen-

from her i n h e r i t a n c e , which

account

o

Court

on

the

the only

the Zenith

money

the

valuation

11.
lists,

and

is e q u i v a l e n t

or

items.

the two

in dispute

(2)
is

Plaintiff.
Plaintiff

received

she has kept in a separate

a c c o u n t with

her m o t h e r , which

that the Defendant

had a savings

was

approximately

depleted

from

> Z IU -

isif

$ 6 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 down to about

$400.00.

< co < x
co 2 _j <

uu <x co ^
S "• * UJ
p ^ r- O

13.
costs

That

the

Defendant

in the sum of

has

incurred

attorney

fees

and

$800.00.

b S 3 S3
14.
dent

That

insurance

the

Plaintiff

for

the

will

Defendant

maintain
if

health

and

it is available

acci-

through,

her place of e m p l o y m e n t .
From

the

above

Court arrives at the

and

foregoing

said

divorce

to

from

become

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
C O N C L U S I O N S OF LAW

Fact,

the

LAW

That the P l a i n t i f f , Kathleen

a Decree of Divorce

of

following:
C O N C L U S I O N S OF

1.

Findings

C l o n t z , is entitled

the D e f e n d a n t , Harvey James
final

upon

the

signing

and

to

Clontz,
entry.

2.

That the Plaintiff shall be awarded a lien in the

family

home

in the sum of $ 2 3 , 2 5 0 . 0 0 , said

mined by the Court as follows:
awarded
home,

the

first

which

lien is deter-

That the Defendant shall be

$15,000.00

from

the

is $ 6 1 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 , which was

total
from

value of

the

the

Defendant's

father and had a value of $600.00 when it was given to the
Defendant b a c k in 1962, and t he $1,000.00 has been improvem e n t s , so that the appraised

value of the

land, which was

$1,600.00 will be reduced to $ 1 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 , leaving a net equity
of $ 4 6 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 , with Plaintiff to receive $23,25.0.00.
3.
from

That

the

Plaintiff

home

within

is entitled
six

(6)

to

months

receive
and

mortgage the home to pay the Plaintiff or

her

he must

money
either

sell it, but must

cash her out within six (6) m o n t h s .
4.

That

individual

each

of

the

parties

are

awarded

their

own

retirements.

5.

That neither party is awarded any alimony.

6.

That

Plaintiff

is awarded her house trailer, sub-

ject to the existing m o r t g a g e ; the 1983 Mercury automobile,
subject

to

the

mortgage

balance;

and

those

checking

and

savings accounts in her name and in the name of Plaintiff's
mother.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

6

7.

That

truck,

the

subject

to

checking a c c o u n t s
8.
in

That

her

exhibit

Defendant

9.
follows:

is

his

and

to receive

those

receive

items

that

the

Zenith

1985

those

GMC

4x4

savings

and

additional

that

Defendant

willing

to

the

old

poster

Plaintiff
bed

belonging

rain

l a m p , a n t i q u e sewing m a c h i n e , cream s e p a r a t e r , milk

belonged

one-half

(%)

rug

with

(2)

statues,

of

him.
as

dresser,

bed

grandparents,

on

with

are

iron

to P l a i n t i f f ' s

tires

give

Big

mirror

snow

to

the

those

(5)

to

(2)

his list, plus

is

awarded

two

on

items

Plaintiff

television,
tires,

items

to give to the P l a i n t i f f , and

those

items

those items set forth

five

belonging

0

awarded

indebtedness

is willing

That

is

in his n a m e .

plus

shall

additional

the

Plaintiff

exhibit,

in his

Defendant

rims,

wrought

g r a n d m o t h e r , cedar c h e s t ,

portapote,

round

to g r a n d p a r e n t s , s t e r e o - r e c o r d

mirror,

can
swan

combination,

the d i s h e s , m a c r a m e , s u i t c a s e s , hair d r y e r ^

Indian
toy

d o l l s , crafts
box

made

by

that

Plaintiff

Plaintiff's

has m a d e ,

father,

two

personal

b e l o n g i n g s , cuckoo clock and/or cocker c 1 ock given to Plaintiff

by

drawer
ih)

of

her

sister,

cabinet,
the

miscellaneous

bug

killer,

stereo-record

picture

albums

of

knick-knacks,

player
the

combination,
children,

three

(3)

one-half

diamonds

and

j e w e l r y , glue g u n , l a m p , rocking c h a i r , m i c r o -

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
C O N C L U S I O N S OF LAW

7

wave oven and s t a n d , kitchen utensils
sion,

couch

computer

sold

and

by

those

Plaintiff

items

to

in P l a i n t i f f s p o s s e s the

of p r o p e r t y

parties'

she has

daughter,

in her p o s s e s -

sion,
10.
4x4

That

truck,

16

landscaping
the

the

horse

trailer,

inoperative

television
dryer,

Defendant

fan

power
tent

Zenith

awarded
and

kitchen

ammunition,

deep

stove,

RCA

television,

bedroom

set,

kitchen

set hardwood

head

11.
(13)

That

U.S.

equally
the

in

bonds

Defendant,
bonds

is

Rainbow
the

value,

and

or

room

extra

dresser

his

shall

be

however

Plaintiff

one-half

(^)

the

the

total

which

8

operative

Zenith

and

couch,
and

wood

chest

in

of

of

burning
blond

drawers,

tools, telescope,

personal
awarded
are

belongings.
the

to

be

the

Defendant

thirteen
divided

the value

to be awarded
of

and

rounds

supplies,

to d e t e r m i n e

value

washer
utensils

rifles

they

value

the

$205.03.

F I N D I N G S OF FACT AND
C O N C L U S I O N S OF LAW

and

motor,

clothes

and

GMC

caterpillar,

kitchen

set,

1985

boat with

the

trailer

vacuum

with

of

with

maple, Defendant's

Bonds,

$410.06,

fishing

refrigerator,
camp

the

tractor,

Plaintiff,

Plaintiff

that

awarded

appliances,

freeze,

Savings

and

the

dining

waterbed,

to

trailer,

kitchen

be

garden

television

to

possession,

power

shall

to

thirteen
is

entitled

of
the

(13)
to

12.
awarded

That the P l a i n t i f f
to

13.
ney,

John

her

on

is e n t i t l e d

Saturday,

April

That P l a i n t i f f is o r d e r e d
Blair

Hutchison,

the

12,

to pick up the
1986,

day of A p r i l ,

1986.

a.m.

attor-

sum of $ 8 0 0 . 0 0 , and said

DAVID E. R O T H ,

F I N D I N G S OF FACT AND
C O N C L U S I O N S OF LAW

at 1 0 : 0 0

to pay D e f e n d a n t ' s

has been paid in f u l l .
D A T E D this

items

sum

PETE N. V L A H O S , ESQ. , # 3 3 3 7
VLAHOS & SHARP
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
O g d e n , Utah
84401
Telephone:
621-2464

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL

D I S T R I C T COURT OF WEBER

COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

KATHLEEN

CLOMTZ,

/

Plaintiff,

/

vs.

/

HARVEY JAMES C L O N T Z ,

/

Defendant.

/

This

matter

having

come

on

25th day of M a r c h , 1 9 8 6 , before
one

of

out

a

the Judges
j u r y , and

of the
the

and

having

been

copy
the

with
shown

his

of a C o m p l a i n t
Defendant

DECREE OF

filed

DIVORCE

attorney,
the

and
his

Civil

92534

No.

David

on

in

person

the

E. Roth,,
with-

and

with

the D e f e n d a n t appearing

John

of

responsive

1

trial

Court sitting

appearing

Blair

Defendant

a copy

for

the H o n o r a b l e

above entitled

Plaintiff

that

DIVORCE

regularly

her a t t o r n e y , Pete N. V l a h o s , and
person

DECREE OF

Hutchison,

was duly

the

it

served with a

S u m m o n s , and

pleadings,

and

in

and

wherein
each

of

the

parties

behalf,

having

proffers

been

sworn

of proof

chambers concerning

and

having

several

testifying

been

made

in

their

own

to the Court

i t e m s , that exhibits having

in

been

offered and received, and the Court being fully cognizant of
all matters pertaining
of

Fact

and

t h e r e i n , and having made its

Conclusions

of

Law, separately

stated

Findings
in writ-

ing, NOW T H E R E F O R E ,
IT IS HEREBY
1.
Decree
said

home
the

That
of

Plaintiff,

Divorce
to

2.

the

That
the

Court

first

the

divorce

in

ORDERED, ADJUDGED

sum

as

from

$ 5 1 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 , which

Plaintiff

from
was

of $600.00 when

1962,

and

appraised
reduced
with

That
the

$1,500.00,

the

the

it was

the

said

total

from

the

signing

Clontz,

and

entry.

a lien in the

family

lien

is determined

Defendant

value

James

a

is

awarded

of the h o m e , which

Defendant's

by
the
is

father and had a,

given to the Defendant back in
been

land,
leaving

i m p r o v e m e n t s , so that

which

was

a

equity

net

$1,600.00
of

will

the
be

$46,500.00,

Plaintiff to receive $ 2 3 , 2 5 0 . 0 0 .
3.

from

to

of

C l o n t z , is granted

is awarded

$1,000.00 has

value

upon

$23,250.00,

value

the

final

follows:

$15,000.00

Kathleen

DECREED as f o l l o w s :

the D e f e n d a n t , Harvey

become

of

AND

the

DECREE OF

That
home

Plaintiff
within

DIVORCE

is
six

entitled
(6)

2

months

to

receive
and

he

her

must

money
either

mortgage

the home

to pay

cash her out within six
4.

That

individual

ject

each

the

P l a i n t i f f or sell .it, but must

(6) m o n t h s .

of

the

parties

are

That neither party

is awarded

6.

That

awarded

Plaintiff

the existing

subject

to

savings

their

own

retirements.

5.

to

awarded

the

is

mortgage;

mortgage

accounts

in her

her

the

and

Defendant

is

alimony.

house

trailer,

1983 Mercury

balance;
name

any

and

those

sub-

automobile,
checking

in the name of

and

Plaintiff's

mother.
7.

2 S?a5
y

< © < r

•.

'^ 2

j

-i

That

truck,

the

subject

to

the

awarded

indebtedness

her

and

1985

those

CMC

4x4

savings

and

<

>-Dtut:
D
UJ cr co

checking

accounts

in his n a m e .

* 2O^ z
8.

5 t ;S 3 o
in

That

her

in his

Plaintiff

exhibit,
exhibit

Defendant

follows:

receive

items
That

that

the

Zenith

(5)

Big

iron

bed

belonging

rain

l a m p , antique

DIVORCE

items

Plaintiff

two

those

items set
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appropriate, the court erred in providing that
alimony continue until age 65 without regard
to the possibility of remarriage, cohabitation,

^specially for a period as long as five full
years, it is to be expected that the equity share
pf the spouse who does not have the pre-sale

complained that although the trial court j
awarded him 50% of the equity in the marital j
home, it permitted plaintiff the right to live in j
the home for five years without any provision
that interest would accrue on the equity share - j
- the substantial investment - he had in j
the home.
As.to the first issue, the alimony awarded
by the trial court is really on the low end of
what is appropriate under the doctrine reiterated in Paffel in view of the parties' ages and
education, as well as the length of their marriage and the substantial disparity in their
incomes. It is a modest award and defendant
cannot have reasonably thought there was any
remote possibility of it being disturbed on
appeal.
The second issue is equally frivolous. Although the decree recited that alimony would
continue until defendant's former wife
reached 65 and did not expressly refer to
earlier termination upon her remarriage or
other change of circumstance, defendant's
c&T&scTi Y8» a&tatyeA. V$ *\&V&&. \i\aSa. Cote
Ann. §30-3-5(5) (1986) provides that
unless a decree of divorce "specifically provides otherwise," an award of alimony terminates upon remarriage.
Section 30-3-5(6)
provides that alimony also terminates upon
cohabitation unless the arrangement is free of
sexual contact. At oral argument, defendant
asserted that his concern was that the "until
age 65" language might be deemed to mean
the decree had "specifically provide[d] otherwise" and required alimony be paid until age
65 regardless of whether plaintiff remarried.
Taking an appeal to obtain clarification and
reassurance on that point is clearly overkill.
Plaintiff immediately conceded that under the
statute alimony would ^of course terminate
before age 65 should the plaintiff remarry or
take on a male roommate. Timely objection
to the phraseology of the decree, motion for
clarification, or even a letter to opposing
counsel would have readily elicited all the
comfort defendant desired on this score. And
as the majority points out, the continuing

reasonable rate, even though that interest
might not be payable until the sale proceeds
are available. Such a provision is necessary to
compensate the spouse who has to find someplace else to live without access to his or her
substantial investment which remains tied up
in his or her former home. Failure to include a
provision for interest would, in my judgment,
ordinarily constitute an abuse of discretion
where the period during which sale is deferred
is of more than incidental duration. Although
I, like the majority, believe no abuse was
committed in this particular case, chiefly
because the alimony award as such was quite
meager, I believe defendant was entitled to our
review of that issue to make sure this was
indeed one of those rare situations where a
"no interest" provision would pass muster.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge .

j
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IN THE
U T A H COURT OF APPEALS
Vanza Eckersley BOYLE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Mark K. BOYLE,
Defendant and Respondent.
Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and Bench.
No. 860004-CA
FILED: April 15, 1987
THIRD DISTRICT
Hon. Scott Daniels
ATTORNEYS:
Bruce E. Coke, Larry A. Kirkham for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Paul H. Liapis, Kent M. Kasting for

udes the conclusion that, even absent remarriage or cohabitation, defendant would be
OPINION
obligated to keep paying alimony until his exwife reached age 65 regardless of changes in GREENWOOD, Judge:
the parties' circumstances.
Plaintiff appeals from a Decree of Divorce
It is the third issue which, in my judgment, which distributed property and debts between
keeps defendant's appeal outside the realm of the parties, cancelled pre-marital note execfrivolousness. When a residence, is a major uted by; defendant in favor of plaintiff, denied
marital asset, it has Income quite common to plaintiff alimony^ and granted a divorce to.
order it sold and the net proceeds divided. both parties.-%
,.,..>,..,,„....,. ,^ . n
When the needs of the parties or their children
The parties married in 1974 when: rjdalntifi|
require, it is equally common to defer the time was 56 years old and.defendanr^63#BotI^itS3|
of sale. In the latter situation, however, and ^prior marriages. They separated in-1981 -an&
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code •Go's Annotation Service
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had no children born of their marriage. Prior 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), appellant claimed
to the marriage plaintiff owned a home and that the trial court had improperly distributed
had substantial savings. Defendant borrowed property. The Utah Supreme Court stated
$8,000 from plaintiff for payment of taxes that findings of fact must include valuation of
prior to the marriage and executed a note assets in order to permit appellate review. In
reflecting that loan. Some repayment occu- Jones, as here, counsel for the party seeking
rred after the marriage. Plaintiffs assets were such review had prepared the findings of fact,
partially depleted during the marriage by conclusions of law and decree of divorce and
purchase of a home and automobiles. Plain- had not included, nor attempted to include,
tiff also provided funds to defendant for values in those pleadings. The Supreme Court
payment of gambling debts. Defendant, an declined to disturb the property distribution,
attorney, contributed his income during the stating that such claim had been waived
marriage to the couple's living expenses. because the party seeking reversal failed to
Plaintiff deposited $9,300 of her pre-marital attempt to include property values in the finassets in a joint Merrill Lynch account with an dings of fact. Jones at 1074-75. We agree
initial total balance of $20,000. After the that a failure to include property valuations in
parties separated they each withdrew funds divorce actions may, in some cases, constitute
from the Merrill Lynch account, creating an an abuse of discretion fufficient to require
overdraft of approximately $10,000.
remand for determination of values. However,
After three days of trial the trial court when the lack of valuation results from the
awarded plaintiff the home of the parties complaining party's own draftsmanship and
subject to the mortgage obligation, the hous- no clear abuse of discretion is otherwise
ehold furnishings, a 1975 Cadillac, a savings proven, we will defer to the trial court's proaccount in her name, and various personal perty distribution. Those factors exist in the
items. Plaintiff and defendant were each case before us and we therefore affirm as to
ordered to repay one-half of the Merrill property and debt division.
Lynch overdraft balance.
Defendant was
Plaintiff claims the court further abused its
awarded his Keogh plan, a country club discretion by failing to award her alimony.
membership, a 1975 Blazer, his pension plan, Medical testimony was received regarding
and various personal items. Defendant was plaintiffs asthma condition and the adverse
also ordered to pay plaintiffs medical bills effect on her ability to be employed. Crossand all back taxes owed through 1981.
examination indicated that plaintiff was able
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court abused to golf frequently despite the asthma, and had
its discretion by (1) refusing to order defen- been the runner-up in a competition held at
dant to pay to plaintiff the balance of the Willow Creek Country Club in 1982. Defen$8,000 note and other sums advanced fay pla- dant testified that income from his law pracintiff to defendant during the marriage for tice had diminished dramatically. His area of
payment of gambling debts; (2) ordering pla- practice, motor carrier transportation law, had
intiff to pay one-half of the Merrill Lynch suffered from the deregulation of that induoverdraft; (3) failing to award plaintiff stry. Also, his major client had terminated
alimony; and (4) granting a divorce to defen- their relationship. Defendant anticipated a
dant as well as to plaintiff. We disagree and continued reduction of his salary for those
affirm the decision of the trial court.
; reasons. The court refused plaintiffs request
This Court will refrain from disturbing to include a finding that plaintiff was unable
findings of the trial court in a divorce action to work. The findings, however, do include
the following language:
unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown.
Searle v, Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah 1974).
That this was not a long term
The triai court is dearly in the best position to
marriage, and the court feels that
weigh the evidence, determine credibility and
each party is being restored to the
arrive at factual conclusions. In this case the
condition which existed at the time
trial judge considered all evidence presented as
of the marriage, and therefore no
to the marital assets and debts as they existed
a l i m o n y should be awarded.
prior to and during the marriage, and subse(Findings of Fact No. 18).
quent to the separation of the parties. It
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the
would be inappropriate for this Court to purpose of alimony is to equalize the standard
reverse on an isolated item of property or debt of living for both spouses, maintain them at
distribution. Rather, this Court must examine their present standard as much as possible,
the entire distribution to determine if the trial and avoid the necessity of one spouse receiving
court abused its discretion.
public assistance. Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d
The findings of fact do not include dollar 379 (Utah 1983). In Jones, the Court reitervalues for most of the property, and debts ated the factors to be examined in determining
distributed, nor does the record indicate any alimony as including:;
effort by plaintiffs counsel, who drafted
those pleadings for court approval, to have
such amounts delineated. In Jones' v. Jones,
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code*Co's Annotation Service
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[1J the financial conditions and
needs of the wife;
WE CONCUR:
[2] the ability of the wife to
R. W. Garff, Judge
produce a sufficient income for
Russell W. Bench, Judge
herself; and
[3] the ability of the husband to
provide support. Jones at 1075.
These criteria were previously adopted in
English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411-12
(Utah 1977). In Jones the Court examined the
Cite as
record for an analysis of the criteria, and
55 Utah Adv. Rep. 53
considered, among other things, the length of
the marriage and the recipient spouse's educIN T H E
ation and employability. The Jones analysis
UTAH COURT OF A P P E A L S
process made it clear that the three pronged
criterion does not preclude considering factors
such as the length of the marriage in awarding Walter M. KATZENBERGER and Ruth
C.Katzenberger,
alimony.
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
In Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986)
v.
the Utah Supreme Court recently listed the STATE of Utah, Salt Lake City Corporation,
same three factors and stated that "[daiiure to Utah State Department of Transportation, and
consider these factors constitutes an abuse of Western Utility Contractors, Inc., dba
discretion." In Paffel the trial courts find- Westcon,
ings did not specifically address all of the
Defendants and Respondents.
required factors. This Court concurs in the
Supreme Court's reflection that more detailed Before Judges Bench, Garff and Greenwood.
findings on each required factor would assist
in the appellate process. However, we find, as No. 860020-CA
did the Supreme Court in Paffel, that "the FILED: April 15, 1987
evidence in this case supports the lower
court's order and appellant has made no THIRD DISTRICT
showing to rebut the presumption that the trial Hon. J. Dennis Frederick
court did consider respondent's income, exp- ATTORNEYS:
enses, and need for support." Id at 102. The John S. Adams, Mark S. Swan for Plaintiffs
third factor, defendant's ability to provide
and Appellants.
support, was also considered by the trial court
David
L. Wilkinson, Steven C. Ward, Roger
in this case. Appellant was awarded most of
F. Cutler, Ray L. Montgomery, Jackson
the marital estate as well as the residue of her
Howard, Leslie W. Slaugh for Defendants
premarital assets. She had received several
and Respondents.
months of temporary support to give her an
opportunity to rehabilitate. Evidence was i
OPINION
received and disputed as to plaintiff's ability
to obtain employment, given her health conBENCH, Judge:
ditions. Plaintiff had worked up to eight
Plaintiffs Walter and Ruth Katzenberger
years prior to the marriage of the parties.
Defendant testified that his income had decr- appeal from a summary judgment dismissing
eased and was not likely to increase, because their action for reformation of a deed and
of the change in the nature of his law practice. from a judgment against them for trespass and
The short marriage of the parties resulted in intentional interference with contractual reladiminution of both plaintiffs assets and def- tions. We reverse the summary judgment and
endant's earning abilities. The trial court remand the case for trial.
In early September, 1970, plaintiffs contaconsidered all proffered evidence and rendered I
a decision to equalize, as far as possible,, the cted the then Utah Department of Highways,
adverse impact of the divorce on both. All | now defendant Utah Department rf Transpthree of the factors required by Paffel were ortation, to inquire about purchasing a small
considered by the court. This court finds no pie-shaped piece of property located between
the eastern boundary of their property and the
abuse of discretion in the denial of alimony.
There is no merit in plaintiffs contention 1-215 Belt Route fence. Letter and telephone
that defendant should not have been granted a negotiations ensued. The v State indicated a
divorce.
Both parties testified ;On their willingness to sell the property^and quoted a
grounds for divorce and it was within the \ prjreof $25,<X). O n ^
sound discretion of the trial judge to grant a Katzenberger mailed a check in tliat amount to
the State Road Commission. In a cover letter
divorce to both.
which accompanied the check, she indicated
Affirmed. Costs to defendant.
1 the check was "for [the] property we have
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code • Co's Annotation Service
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3. There is no indication of what disposition was
made of that charge. One Porsche, 526 P.2d at
917.
4. Without legal analysis or authority, Honda contends that One Pontiac is not controlling because
the decision post-dates* the trial. We decline to
enter into a detailed analysis of this issue, State v.
Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984), except
to say that Honda's contention is without merit.
See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 10607 (1971). For cases construing similar statutory
language see, e.g., U.S. v. One (1) 1982 28' International Vessel, 741 F.2d 1319 (11th Cir. 1984);
U.S. v. One 1975 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d 196 (6th
Cir. 1978); U.S. v. One 1975 Ford Pickup Truck,
558 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1977); Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
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IN THE
U T A H COURT OF A P P E A L S
Joan EAMES,
• Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Emerson EAMES,
Defendant and Appellant.
Before Judges Davidson, Orme and Garff
No. 860019-CA
FILED: April 9, 1987
FIRST DISTRICT
Hon. Omer J. Call
ATTORNEYS:
George W. Preston for Defendant and
. Appellant.
Gordon J. Low for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
DAVIDSON, Judge:
The trial court granted a divorce to plaintiff
Joan Eames from defendant Emerson Eames.
The Judgment and Decree provided for a
distribution of property and an award of
alimony to plaintiff. On appeal, defendant
seeks a reversal of the trial court's judgment
as it relates to alimony and distribution of
property. We affirm.
The parties were married for thirty years
with three children born to the union. At the
time of trial in January, 1984, the youngest
child was 18 years old and resided with plaintiff in the family home while she attended
college.' Defendant had moved to a "different
l residence: Plaintiff was employed as a department manager and clerk for a large store and
her gross income was approximately $10,000
For complete Utah Code Annotations,
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per year.
She had been employed during
most of the marriage in unskilled or untrained
type positions. Mr. Eames was a manufacturing engineer with Morton-Thiokol and had
worked with that corporation since 1962. His
gross income was approximately $34,000 per
year.
Because the parties placed widely
varying valuations on their items of personal
property, the trial judge made the division
without finding specific values for each item.
In addition to her share of the personal property, the plaintiff received her equity in a
partnership consisting of members of her
paternal family (Five Way Partnership), previous distributions from this partnership, her
inherited property, gifts from her father, and
a one-half interest in the family home.
Plaintiff was given the right to live in the
home until February 1, 1989, or until it was
sold by agreement of the parties, whichever
came first. While in the home, Mrs. Eames
was responsible for payment of taxes, insurance, and mortgage installments. Defendant
received his share of the personal property, his
separate bank account, the inheritance from
his parents, and an undivided one-half interest in the family home less the mortgage
indebtedness at the time of trial. Each partyreceived one-half of the other's retirement
benefit, to be paid when it was received. This
provision was subject to the approved formula
which considers the number of years worked
during the marriage. Defendant's retirement
was vested while the plaintiff's was not, his
being much more valuable than hers.
Plaintiff was awarded alimony in the
amount of $450.00 per month so long as the
youngest child successfully pursued a full lime
college education, lived in the family home,
remained single, or reached the age of 21
years. Then alimony was reduced to $300.00
per month and would remain so until plaintiff
reached the age of 65 years. At that time
alimony would terminate.
Defendant claims error in the distribution of
the real and personal property of the parties
and in the award of alimony. The trial court
has statutory authority to decree an equitable
distribution of property in a divorce action
under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1986).
In the case of King v: King, 111 P.2d 715
(Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court emphasized that it would accord considerable deference to the trial court's judgment and treat
its findings with a presumption of validity. An
appellant has the burden of showing that the
trial court's award "works such a manifest
injustice or inequity as to clearly be an abuse
of that broad discretion [in adjusting the financial needs and property interests of the
parties]/ ,. , . ;
:
/
v
The trial record exposes the disparities in
education, income, and earning potential
between the parties. The record also reveals
that any future income from the Five Way
consult CodeoCo's Annotation Service

50

55 UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

Partnership will be considerably less than
defendant asserts. Defendant's claimed right
to receive interest on his one-half interest in
the home's equity for the period until February 1, 1989, is offset by the plaintiffs need
to provide shelter and support for the parties'
youngest child while she attends college. It is
presumed the trial judge took these economic
realities into consideration and, on balance, it
can be said that he strove for an equitable
distribution of the property.
A recent Utah Supreme Court opinion
concerning alimony, Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d
96, 100 (Utah 1986), states that the purpose of
spousal support is to "enable the receiving
spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage
and to prevent the spouse from becoming a
public charge/ The appellate courts should
not interfere with such an award without a
showing of a ''clear and prejudicial abuse of
discretion". The Court in Paffel further set
. forth what must be considered by the trial
court to avoid a challenge to the award as
being an abuse of discretion. These factors
are, (1) the financial condition and needs of
the spouse claiming support, (2) the ability of
that spouse to provide sufficient income for
him or herself, and (3) the ability of the responding spouse [Mr. Eames] to provide the
support. The trial record here shows that the
court below carefully and properly considered
the above factors. There was no abuse of
discretion. Therefore, the award of alimony
will not be disturbed.
Plaintiff requests attorney's fees on appeal.
This issue is governed by R. Utah Ct. App:
33(a) in that this Court may award costs and
attorney's fees to the prevailing party if we
determine the appeal to be either frivolous or
brought for delay.
The instant appeal is
without merit but the record must be examined to determine whether or not it is frivolous
or brought for delay. In Cady v. Johnson,
671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983), the Court
implied the awarding of attorney's fees required a finding that the suit was lacking in good
faith and then defined "good faith" as:
(1) An honest belief in the propriety
of the activities in question;
(2) no intent to take unconscionable
advantage of others; and
(3) no intent to, or knowledge of
the fact that the, activities in question will, [sic] hinder, delay or
defraud others.
The Court recognizes the right of a party to
argue in an attempt to correct what that party
deems to be error in the court below.
However, when there is no basis for the argument presented and when the evidence or law
is mischaracterized and misstated, the Court
must question the party's motives.
The
record shows the trial judge making Findings

Codc^Co
Provo, Utah

of Fact, dividing tjhe property, and awarding
support after a careful consideration of all the
evidence. Defendant ignores this. Mr. Eames
claims the trial court erred in awarding
alimony to his wifp. This attempt at deprivation of alimony is cjontrary to the intent of F/ercher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah
1980), which was ^ited in defendant's brief.
Surely a wife of tturty years deserves something more than being cast adrift in the sea of
economic uncertainty without some long term
support from a husband with superior earning
potential. Defendant refuses to accept the
evidence presented concerning plaintiffs interest in the Five Way Partnership. He continues to argue that the interest is of great and
increasing value. He refuses to acknowledge
the uncontroverted evidence that past distributions resulted from the sale of assets. He
incorrectly argues for a valuation based upon
the past rather than a valuation at the time of
trial. Defendant also'fails to recognize that he
was awarded his own inheritance and fails to
consider any income potential from that
source.
Defendant further misstates the law when he.
argues that the alimony award cannot be
changed in the future. Utah Code Ann. §303-5 (1986) specifically reserves jurisdiction to
the trial court to "make subsequent changes or
new orders for the support and maintenance
of the parties...."
The totality of defendant's argument
compels this Court to find that he is attempting to take unconscionable advantage of his
wife and that this appeal is frivolous. Therefore, it fails to meet the standards of good
faith and R. Utah Ct. App. 33(a) applies.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court,
award costs against the defendant, and
remand to the trial court for a determination
of plaintiff's attorney's fees which are
ordered to be paid by the defendant.
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
I CONCUR:
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
ORME, Judge: (Dissenting in part)
I agree with the majority that the decision
below must be affirmed. The trial court's
disposition is well within the realm of reasonableness and no abuse of discretion has been
demonstrated. While I agree the appeal is not
well taken, I am not convinced it was frivolously taken and I dissent from the majority's
imposition of attorney's fees against defendant.
Defendant had three major gripes with the
trial court's decision. First, he did not think
any alimony should have been awarded
because' his former wife is able-bodied and
gainfully employed; Second, he contended
that even if some award o f alimony were

For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code •Go's Annotation Service
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appropriate, the court erred in providing that
alimony continue until age 65 without regard
to the possibility of remarriage, cohabitation,
or other changed circumstance. Finally, he
complained that although the trial court
awarded him 50% of the equity in the marital
home, it permitted plaintiff the right to live in
the home for five years without any provision
that interest would accrue on the equity share - the substantial investment — he had in
the home.
As to the first issue, the alimony awarded
by the trial court is really on the low end of
what is appropriate under the doctrine reiterated in Paffel in view of the parties' ages and
education, as well as the length of their marriage and the substantial disparity in their
incomes. It is a modest award and defendant
cannot have reasonably thought there was any
remote possibility of it being disturbed on
appeal.
The second issue is equally frivolous. Although the decree recited that alimony would
continue until defendant's former wife
reached 65 and did not expressly refer to
earlier termination upon her remarriage or
other change of circumstance, defendant's
concern is allayed by statute. Utah Code
A n n . §30-3-5(5) (1986) provides that
unless a decree of divorce "specifically provides otherwise," an award of alimony terminates upon remarriage.
Section 30-3-5(6)
provides that alimony also terminates upon
cohabitation unless the arrangement is free of
sexual contact. At oral argument, defendant
asserted that his concern was that the "until
age 65" language might be deemed to mean
the decree had "specifically provide[d] otherwise" and required alimony be paid until age
65 regardless of whether plaintiff remarried.
Taking an appeal to obtain clarification and
reassurance on that point is clearly overkill.
Plaintiff immediately conceded that under the
statute alimony would of course terminate
before age 65 should the plaintiff remarry or
take on a male roommate. Timely objection
to the phraseology of the decree, motion for
clarification, or even a letter to opposing
counsel would have readily elicited all the
comfort defendant desired on this score. And
as the majority points out, the continuing
jurisdiction provision of §30-3-5(3) precludes the conclusion that, even absent remarriage or cohabitation, defendant would be
obligated to keep paying alimony until his exwife reached age 65 regardless of changes in
the parties' circumstances.
It is the third issue which, in my judgment,
keeps defendant's appeal outside the realm of
frivolousness. When a residence is a major
marital asset, it has become quite common to
order it sold and the net proceeds divided.
When the needs of the parties or their children
require, it is equally common to defer the time
of sale. In the latter situation, however, and
~~
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especially for a period as long as five full
years, it is to be expected that the equity share
of the spouse who does not have the pre-sale
use of the home will accrue interest at some
reasonable rate, even though that interest
might not be payable until the sale proceeds
are available. Such a provision is necessary to
compensate the spouse who has to find someplace else to live without access to his or her
substantial investment which remains tied up
in his or her former home. Failure to include a
provision for interest would, in my judgment,
ordinarily constitute an abuse of discretion
where the period during which sale is deferred
is of more than incidental duration. Although
1, like the majority, believe no abuse was
committed in this particular case, chiefly
because the alimony award as such was quite
meager, I believe defendant was entitled to our
review of that issue to make sure this was
indeed one of those rare situations where a
"no interest" provision would pass muster.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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Vanza Eckersley BOYLE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
MarkK. BOYLE,
Defendant and Respondent.
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THIRD DISTRICT
Hon. Scott Daniels
ATTORNEYS:
Bruce E. Coke, Larry A. Kirkham for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Paul H. Liapis, Kent M. Kasting for ;
Defendant and Respondent.
OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:

Plaintiff appeals from a Decree of Divorce
which distributed property and debts between
the parties, cancelled pre-marital note executed by defendant in favor of plaintiff, denied
plaintiff alimony, and granted a divorce to
both parties.
The parties married in 1974 when plaintiff
was 56 years old and defendant 63. Both had
prior marriages. They separated in 1981 and
F o r complete Utah C o d e Annotations, consult Code • Co's Annotation Service
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covered by Airport's insurance issued by
Home was a genuine issue of material fact
that precluded summary judgment. Utah R.
Civ, P. 56(c). Airport's limited concession of
liability does not cure this problem; it was not
a concession that Christiansen accepted. At
oral argument on the motions, Christiansen
maintained that Holiday was covered by the
Home policy. Absent a resolution of that
issue, the court could not determine whether
Airport was liable at all. For this reason,
summary judgment on the issue of damages
was improper. Therefore, we reverse the trial
court's grant of Airport's motion for
summary judgment.
Christiansen also argues on appeal tfiat the
district court should have granted her motion
for summary judgment against Airport and
Home for the full amount of the stipulated
judgment. There is no merit to this position.
The court properly decided that Home's liability could not be determined because Home
had not been joined as a party and, therefore,
would not be bound by such a judgment.
And, as indicated previously, there was a
genuine issue of material fact that precluded
any determination of the liability of: either
Home or Airport.
^
Christiansen - counters that the failure to
bring Home into the action is not a basis for
denying her a judgment for the full amount of
the tort award. She reasons that under Utah
law, a plaintiff must direct any action against
the tort-feasor and may not name the tortfeasor's insurer as a party to an action. Since
she was precluded from naming Home, that
fact cannot be used to deny her the full judgment to which she is entitled.
It is true that Home could not be a named
party in Christiansen's original tort action
against Holiday. Christensen v. Peterson, 25
Utah 2d 411, 483 P.2d 447 (1971); Young v.
Barney, 20 Utah 2d 108, 433 P.2d 846 (1967).
But once she settled with Holiday and began
pursuing Holiday's assigned rights, which
included Holiday's claims against both
Airport and Home, nothing precluded her
from bringing Home into the action for a
determination of "the coverage of its insurance
policy and its liability for the tort judgment
against Holiday. See Utah R. Civ. P. 20-21.
However, as matters stand, due to plaintiffs
failure to join Home, the issue of whether
Holiday was covered by the Home insurance
policy has yet to be resolved. We are therefore
unmoved by Christiansen's argument and
affirm the trial court's denial of her motion
for a summary judgment.
The judgment below is reversed in part and
affirmed in part.

Christine M. Durham, Justice
1. Christiansen asserts on appeal that Home's
lawyer is actually conducting Airport's defense and
that there has been collusion between Airport and
Home in an attempt to deny Christiansen the benefits of the insurance policy. Specifically, she argues
that Home is attempting to limit its potential exposure to $15,000 by having Airport admit that it
breached its agreement and by agreeing to pay any
judgment based on that breach. Although there may
be substance to Christiansen's charges, that fact
does not alter our conclusion.
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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Gary V. PETERSEN,
Appellant,
v,
Julie A. PETERSEN,
Respondent.
Before Judges Orme, Jackson and Bench*
No, 860007-CA
FILED: May 18,1987
SECOND DISTRICT
Hon. Calvin Gould
ATTORNEYS:
Paul M. Belnap for Appellant.
Pete N. Vlahos for Respondent.
OPINION
ORME, Judge:
The appellant seeks a reversal or readjustment of the property division and alimony
awarded to his former wife upon their divorce.
His challenge focuses,on a $120,000 property
settlement given to his ex-wife to reflect her
interest in his medical degree. We affirm the
trial court's basic disposition, but require
amendment of the decree insofar as the
$120,000 award is concerned.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The parties were married in September 1963
when they were, both entering their senior year
of college. Both .graduated with Bachelor's
degrees. Dr. Petersen continued his education
and obtained a Master's degree, while Mrs.
Petersen worked as an elementary school
teacher to help finance her husband's education. After receiving his Master's degree, Dr.
Petersen entered medical school. During
medical school, Dr. Petersen earned approximately $1,000 per year in injcome. The couple
also took but a* student loan arid received

WE CONCUR:
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice
I. Daniel Stewart^ Associate Chief Justice ^
Richard C. Howe, Justice
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some money from Mrs. Petersen's parents.
While her husband was in medical school,
Mrs. Petersen worked one year on a M l time
basis and three years part time.
When Dr. Petersen began his internship,
Mrs. Petersen stopped working to stay at
home with their child. During the next fifteen
years, Mrs. Petersen was not employed outside
the home and her teaching certification
expired.
By the time of their divorce, the parties had
been married twenty years and had six children under the age of 18. The decree gave
Mrs. Petersen custody of the six minor children, the family residence subject to the first
mortgage, most of the family furniture, and
two automobiles. She was awarded $300 per
month per child as child support, $.1,000 per
month alimony, and the cash property settlement of $120,000, which Dr. Petersen was to
pay in installments of $1,000 per month
without interest.
Under the decree, Dr. Petersen received his
professional corporation, the total interest in
his pension and profit sharing plan, two condominiums, a boat, an undivided oneseventh interest in a cabin near Bear Lake,
and other rental property. He also was given
the right to claim all six children as dependents for income tax purposes.
The trial court explained the $120,000 cash
settlement as follows:
The Court believes that this case is
classic, in that defendant is entitled
to a property award reflecting an
ownership interest of the defendant
in plaintiffs medical degree. It is
abundantly clear that defendant
helped plaintiff earn that degree
during their marriage, and that
plaintiffs ability to earn is based
upon that degree. Further, that
following the earning of the degree
and the entry into the medical practice, by mutual agreement, defendant undertook the raising and
nurturing of the children as her
responsibility to the marital partnership, while plaintiff practiced
medicine. It is difficult to find in
the evidence presented any system
for the measurement of the value of
the degree, and the Court must
therefore deal with the case mostly
upon an alimony basis. To deal
with the case fully upon an alimony
basis is not fair to the defendant,
inasmuch as any effort to restructure her life by seeking to better her
employment opportunities or to remarry will operate against her
alimony rights. Defendant is therefore awarded $1,000 per month
permanent alimony and a lump sum
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property award in respect to the
medical degree in the amount of
$120,000, payable in installments of
$1,000 per month from the date of
the decree.
On appeal, Dr. Petersen argues that the
division of marital property was inequitable,
particularly the $120,000 property settlement
given to his wife. Dr. Petersen argues that it
was error to characterize "his" medical degree
as marital property and require him to cash
out Mrs. Petersen's interest therein over a 10year period.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
Generally, the trial court is permitted considerable discretion in adjusting the financial
and property interests of the parties to a
divorce action ancj its determinations are entitled to a presumption of validity. E.g.,
Burnham v. Burnhnm, 716 P.2d 781, 782
(Utah 1986). And although appellate courts
may weigh the evidence and substitute their
judgment for that of the trial court in divorce
actions, as the Supreme Court stated in Turner
v. Turner, 649 ?.2d 6 (Utah 1%2), "this court
will not do so lightly and merely because its
judgment may differ from that of the trial
judge, A trial court's apportionment of property will not be disturbed unless it works
such a manifest injustice or inequity as to
indicate a clear abuse of discretion." 649 P.2d
at 8.
In the present case, the trial court appropriately attempted to equalize the parties' respective standards of living. See Olson v.
Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985). Dr.
Petersen was found capable of earning
$100,000 per year while Mrs. Petersen's ability
to obtain recertification and secure a teaching
contract was found to be speculative at best.
Even if she succeeded, she would earn only
one-fourth to one-fifth of what Dr. Petersen would earn annually. The trial court
spoke of the difficulty of measuring the value
of Dr. Petersen's degree. The court chose to
balance the inequalities between the parties
partly with the alimony award. However, the
trial court did not want Mrs. Petersen to lose
all of her entitlement upon remarriage, so the
trial court provided for an additional $120,000
as a property award, payable in $1,000
monthly installments. Characterization of
these payments as a property award created
the main issue for appeal.
DEGREES AS PROPERTY
The question of whether an advanced degree
is a property interest subject to division upon
divorce is one of first impression at the appellate level in Utah.1 However, the majority of
jurisdictions that have considered the issue
have held that advanced degrees or professi-
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onal licenses are not property. Wisner v.
Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115, 122
(Ariz. App. 1981)(husband's medical license
and board certificate are not property subject
to division, but education is a factor to be
considered in arriving at equitable property
division, maintenance, and child support); In
re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App.3d 446,
152 Cah Rptr, 668, 677 (1979)(legal education |
not a property right); In re Marriage of I
Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75, 77 |
(1978)(MBA degree not marital property I
subject to division); In re Marriage of Hortsman, 263 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Iowa 1978)(law
degree is not a distributable asset upon
divorce; future earnings, are); Olah v. Olah,
135 Mich. App. 404, 354 N.W.2d 359, 361
(Mich App. 1984)(medical degree not property
or marital asset); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 I
N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527, 536 (1982)(courts may I
not make any permanent distribution of the |
value of professional degrees and licenses, j
whether based on estimated worth or cost);
Ruben v. Ruben, 461 A.2d 733, 735 (N.H.
1983)(graduate degree acquired by one spouse
during the marriage is not an asset subject to
division upon divorce); Muckleroy v. Muckleroy, 84 N.M. 14, 498 P.2d 1357, 1358
(1972)(medical license is not community property); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747,
750-751 (Okl. 1979)(medical license not
property but wife entitled to compensation for
her investment).2
These cases and others are consistent with
our understanding of what "property" is and
what an educational degree is. Property can be
bought, sold, and devised. Bona fide degrees
cannot be bought; they are earned. They
cannot be sold; they are personal to the named
recipient. Upon the death of the named recipient, the certificate commemorating award of
the degree might be passed along and treasured as a family heirloom, but the recipient
may not, on the strength of that degree, practice law or medicine. In this case, the court
awarded the parties' home to Mrs. Peterson.
But it might have awarded the home to Dr.
Petersen or it might have ordered the home
sold and the net proceeds divided. The court
had no such alternatives with the medical
degree, precisely because the degree is not
property. Consideration of some of the cases
cited above and others supports our fundamental conclusion and demonstrates the range
of related problems.
In Muckleroy v. Muckleroy, 84 N.M. 14,
498 P.2d 1357 (1972), it had been argued that
the husband's education was the product of
the joint labor and industry of both parties, so
that after their marriage it was community
property. The New Mexico Supreme Court
rejected this argument and concluded:
A medical license is only a permit
issued by the controlling authority
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of the State, authorizing the individual licensee to engage in the practice of medicine. The medical
license may be used and enjoyed by
the licensee as a means of earning a
livelihood, but it is not community
property because it cannot be the
subject of joint ownership.
84 N.M. at 15,498 P.2d at 1358.
The same issue arose as to an M.B.A.
degree earned by the husband in In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75
(1978). Again, the concept of an advanced
degree being property was rejected:
An educational degree, such as an
M.B.A., is simply not encompassed
even by the broad views of the
concept of "property/ It does not
have an exchange value or any .
objective transferable value on an
open market. It is personal to the
holder. It terminates on death of
the holder and is not inheritable. It
cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed, or pledged. An
advanced degree is a cumulative
product of many years of previous
education, combined with diligence
and hard work. It may not be acquired by the mere expenditure of
money. It is simply an intellectual
achievement that may potentially
assist in* the future acquisition of
property. In our view, it has none
of the attributes of property in the
usual sense of that term.
194 Colo, at 432; 574 P.2d at 77.
The wife in Graham had worked full time
throughout the couple's six-year marriage,
and had contributed 70 percent of the family
income in addition, to most of the household
work while her husband was acquiring his
degree. The trial court found that the degree
was jointly owned property and had determined that the future earning value of the
M . B . A . degree to Mr. Graham was
$82,836.00. Mrs. Graham was awarded
$33,134.00 of that amount. On appeal, the
state supreme court affirmed the reversal of
the trial court by the court of appeals. 574
P.2d at 76. The fact that the decision left Mrs.
Graham with nothing to show for her six years
of labor prompted a three judge dissent which
strongly urged that the husband's increased
earning power represented by the degree
should be considered marital property, where
there was no accumulated property and the
spouse who subsidized the degree was ineligible for maintenance.3 574 P.2d at 78-79.
The equitable concerns addressed in the
Graham dissent are reflected in the few cases
that have found an advanced degree or professional license to be marital property.
In Daniels v. Daniels, 185 N.E.2d 773 (Ohio
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1961), the court held that the right to practice
medicine was in the nature of a franchise and
constituted property which the trial court had
a right to consider in making an award of
alimony. In Daniels, the parties to the action
were married while students at a university.
During the time of their marriage the wife
received her degree in business administration
and the husband received a degree in medicine
one year later. Each contributed toward his or
her own maintenance and education, the
balance in financial support for the family
coming from the wife's father, who contributed sizable sums to the marriage. At the time
of their divorce, neither party had much in the
way of tangible assets. The court awarded
$24,000 in lump sum alimony, but did not
actually divide the value of the medical degree.
185N.E.2dat776.
Recently, in O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d
576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1985), the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's holding that a license to
practice medicine acquired during the marriage
is marital property subject to division. In
O'Brien, the wife was held entitled to a 40
percent interest in her husband's medical
license. The wife had contributed approximately 76 percent of the couples' total income
while the husband obtained his license. The
breakdown of the marriage occurred shortly
after the husband completed his schooling,
and the only tangible asset existing after their
nine-year marriage was the husband's
medical license,
The New York court distinguished its analysis in O'Brien from that of other jurisdictions which have found a license or advanced
degree not to be marital property. As the
O'Brien court explained:
Plaintiff does not contend that his
license is excluded from distribution
because it is separate property;
rather, he claims that it is not property at all but represents a personal attainment in acquiring knowledge. He rests his argument on
decisions in similar cases from other
jurisdictions and on his view that a
license does not satisfy commonlaw concepts of property. Neither
contention is controlling because
decisions in other States rely principally on their own statutes, and
the legislative history underlying
them, and because the New York
Legislature deliberately went beyond
traditional property concepts when
it formulated the Equitable Distribution Law.
66 N.Y,2d at 583, 489 N.E.2d at 715, 498
N.Y.S.2d at 746. New York's highest court
acknowledged in O'Brien that their statute
creates a new species of property, previously

31

unknown at common law or under prior statutes. 66 N.Y.2d at 586, 489 N.E.2d at 719,
498 N.YS.2d at 748. Critical portions of the
New York Equitable Distribution Law provide
that in making an equitable distribution of
marital property, the court shall consider the
efforts one spouse made to the other spouse's
career or career potential and the difficulty of
evaluating an interest in a profession. 66
N.Y.2d at 584, 489 N.E.2d at 715-716, 498
N.Y.S.2d at 746-47. Thus, the analysis in
O'Brien, although illustrative of the equitable
concerns for the working spouse who supports
I the other through an advanced degree, 66
N.Y.2d at 585-588, 489 N.E.2d at 716-718,
498 N.Y.S.2d at 746-48, is limited in application because of the pivotal role of the
unusual and expansive distribution statute
enacted in New York.
We agree with the majority opinion in
Graham that an advanced degree is or confers
an intangible right which, because of its character, cannot properly be characterized as
property subject to division between the
spouses. No special statute, as in New York,
permits us to treat the degree as though it
were property. On the other hand, criteria for
an award of support in Utah are not so rigid
as in Colorado, preventing the harsh result of
Graham. In this state, traditional alimony
analysis is the appropriate and adequate
I method for making adjustments between the
parties in cases of this type.4
AWARD IN TfflS CASE
|
As indicated, the trial court was in error
| when it awarded Mrs. Petersen the $120,000
cash settlement to reflect her share of the
value of her husband's medical degree. NonI etheless, the court's basic disposition was fair
and can be sustained if the $1,000 monthly
payments which Dr. Petersen was to make in
satisfaction of that obligation are recharacterized as additional alimony, a result which is
readily supported by the trial court's findings.
! In reviewing the court's findings, we find
ample evidence to affirm the property division
aside from the $120,000 cash settlement. As
the Supreme Court stated in Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980), "[t]here is no
; fixed formula upon which to determine a
: division of properties, it is a prerogative of the
I court to make whatever disposition of propI erty as it deems fair, equitable, and necessary
I for the protection and welfare of the parties/
i 615 P.2d at 1222. Although Dr. Petersen was
awarded a smaller percentage of the marital
assets, he received all but one of the income
j producing assets: his professional corporation,
I his pension and profit sharing plan, two condominiums, and other business interests. The
I parties were to share evenly in a $10,000 invj estment corporation. We find the basic propI erty division equitable. '
: As for the cash settlement payable in
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monthly installments of $1,000, it is properly
affirmed as alimony, making Mrs. Petersen's
entire alimony award $2,000 per month. Criteria considered in determining a reasonable
award of support must include the financial
conditions and needs of the spouse in need of
support, the ability of that spouse to produce
sufficient income for his or her own support,
and the ability of the other spouse to provide
support. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075
ftJtah.1985).
In this case, then, the first factor to be
considered is the financial condition and needs
of Mrs. Petersen. For over ten years, Mrs.
Petersen and her family enjoyed a very comfortable lifestyle. She now must make mortgage payments on the home and pay for the
ordinary expenses of food, clothing and transportation. Other than the one-half interest
in the investment corporation, Mrs. Petersen
was awarded none of the income-producing
assets. She has no outside income.
The second factor to be considered is Mrs.
Petersen's ability to produce a sufficient
income for herself. Although Mrs. Petersen is
a college graduate with a Bachelor's degree
and is trained as a school teacher, she is not
currently certified. She would require additional training to become certified and, even if
certified, her ability to produce income would
be one fourth to one fifth of what Dr. Petersen's income has provided the family. The
trial court found that the chance of her being
able to secure a teaching contract was
''speculative." During most of the marriage,
Mrs. Petersen was not employed outside the
home. She stopped working, primarily at the
urging of her husband, and devoted her time
to raising their six children. It is unreasonable
to assume that she will be able immediately to
enter the job market and support herself in the
style in which she had been living before the
divorce. See Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072,
1075 (Utah 1985).
The final factor to be considered is the*
ability of Dr. Petersen to provide support.
This is the proper realm in which to consider
advanced degrees or professional licenses. An
advanced degree is ordinarily an indicator of
potential future earnings. In addition,-the
attainment of a degree by one spouse often
results in a disparity of income that is likely to
last for a great time, particularly in cases like"
the present one. Dr. Petersen has a history of
earning more than $100,000 a year and Mrs.
Petersen has not worked for the past fifteen.
But it is the discrepancy in their earning power
which is the basis for alimony; not the discrepancy in their educations. There is no logical
reason, for example, for treating differently a
self-trained artist without formal education
who earns and will earn $100,000 a year and a
doctor with a medical degree who earns and
will earn $100,000 a year. Other things being
equal, if such an artist divorces his or her
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spouse, he or she should pay alimony comparable to that paid by such a doctor. Whether
a spouse's ability to provide support is the
result of an advanced degree or professional
license is irrelevant to the analysis. The key is
the spouse's ability.
In Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah
1983), the Supreme Court explained:
Where a marriage is of long duration and the earning capacity of one
spouse greatly exceeds that of the
other, as here, it is appropriate to
order alimony and child support at
a level which will insure that the
supported spouse and children may
maintain a standard of living not
unduly. disproportionate to that
which they would have enjoyed had
the marriage continued.
658 P.2d at 1205. See Jeppson v. Jeppson, 684
P.2d 69 (Utah 1984).
In Savage, the parties had enjoyed a high
standard of living during the marriage and the
court upheld an award of $2,000 per month
alimony and child support of $500 per month
per child. 658 P.2d at 1205. In Yelderman v.
Yelderman, 669 P.2d 407 (Utah 1983), the
Supreme Court upheld an alimony award of
$2,500 per month as not excessive. 669 P.2d at
409. We agree that $2,000 per month alimony
to Mrs. Petersen is sufficient to help her
maintain a standard of living not unduly disproportionate to that which she would have
enjoyed if the marriage had continued.5
Accordingly, this case is remanded to District Court to amend the decree to provide that
Mrs. Petersen receive $2,000 per month
alimony and, correspondingly, to delete the
$120,000 cash award. The decree is otherwise
affirmed. Each party shall bear his or her own
costs of appeal.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Russell W. Bench, Judge
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
1. In Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P.2d 1308 (Utah 1982), the
Utah Supreme Court dealt with the valuation of a
professional corporation. In Dogu, the husband was
awarded his professional corporation, and his wife
was awarded property to offset its value. 652 P.2d
at 1309. Although the proper characterization of a
medical degree, as Jn the present case, and the valuation of a professional medical corporation, as in
Dogu, may involve related questions, the legal issues
regarding the two are distinct.
In Tremayne v. Tremayne, 116 Utah 483, 211
P.2d 452 (1949), the Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's property division and award of alimony to
the wife, referring to the wife's working to help her
husband through school; the fact that, with the
divorce, the wife was deprived of the benefits of his
increased earnings; and the discrepancy in their
earning capacities. Tremayne does not address the
issue of whether an advanced degree or license is
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marital property.
2. The question of whether an advanced degree or
professional license is marital property subject to
division upon divorce has attracted considerable
attention from legal scholars. For one of the better
reasoned discussions, see Note, Property Distribution in Domestic Relations Law: A Proposal for
Excluding Educational Degrees and Professional
Licenses from the Marital Estate, 11 Hofstra L.
Rev. 1327(1983).
3. In Graham, the wife did not request alimony
because a Colorado statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. §1410-114 (1973), restricted the court's power to
award maintenance to cases where the spouse
seeking it was unable to support himself or herself.
574P.2dat79.
4. In cases like the instant one, life patterns have
largely been set, the earning potential of both
parties can be predicted with some reliability, and
the contributions and sacrifices of the one spouse in
enabling the other to attain a degree have been
compensated by many years of the comfortable lifestyle which the degree permitted. Traditional
alimony analysis works nicely to assure equity in
such cases.
In another kind of recurring case, typified by
Graham, where divorce occurs shortly after the
degree is obtained, traditional alimony analysis
would often work hardship because, while both
spouses have modest incomes at the time of divorce,
the one is on the threshhoid of a significant increase
in earnings. Moreover, the spouse who sacrificed so
the other could attain a degree is precluded from
enjoying the anticipated dividends the degree will
ordinarily provide. Nonetheless, such a spouse is
typically not remote in time from his or her previous
education and is otherwise better able to adjust and
to acquire comptuable skills, given the opportunity
and the funding. In such cases, alimony analysis
must become more creative to achieve fairness, and
an award of "rehabilitative" or "reimbursement"
alimony, net terminable upon remarriage, may be
appropriate. See, e.g., Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis.
2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796 (1984); Mahoney v.
Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
i>. It is clear the court viewed the payments to Mrs.
Petersen, both those it specifically called alimony
and the additional $1,000 monthly payments, as
appropriate for her support. It utilized the
"property" label in characterizing some of the
monthly totai as a means to preclude termination of
the payments to Mrs. Petersen upon her remarriage.
Although the court provided that the $1,000 per
month payments not called alimony would terminate
in ten years, nothing in the court's findings establishes any particular significance to that point in
time. We accordingly see no basis, now that the
entire monthly payment is properly characterized as
alimony, to require that half of the $2,000 monthly
total automatically and arbitrarily terminate at the
end of ten years. Cf. Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564,
567 (Utah 1985) (court modified divorce decree to
delete provision that alimony would terminate after
two years where monthly amount was reasonable
but two-year limit was not). Of course, it would be
proper for the district court to readjust the amount
of alimony awarded to Mrs. Petersen if at any point
in time there develops a material change of circumstances, such as Mrs. Petersen securing gainful
employment or if Dr. Petersen's salary drops dramatically through no fault> of his own. See, e.g.,
Naylor v. Naylor, 700 P.2d 707, 710 (Utah 1985);
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Haslam v. Haslam, 657 P.2d 757, 758 (Utah 1982).
The district court retains continuing jurisdiction in
divorce actions to amend alimony. Utah Code Ann.
§30-3-5 (1986). In addition, the alimony
awarded to Mrs. Petersen automatically terminates
under certain circumstances. Id.
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Dawn W. HORNE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
W. Reid HORNE,
Defendant and Appellant.
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and
Orme.
No. 860060-CA
FILED: May 18, 1987
THIRD DISTRICT
Hon. Kenneth Rigtmp
ATTORNEYS:
Richard K. Crandall, Rodney R. Parker for
Appellant.
Dawn W. Home, Pro Se.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:

Defendant appeals from the trial court's
entry nunc pro tunc of an order distributing
property incident to a previously granted
divorce. We reverse the district court.
The parties were divorced on January 27,
1984. The divorce action was bifurcated with
the four day property division trial to begin on
June 19, 1984./On the second day of the trial,
June 20, 1984, the parties entered into an oral
property settlement agreement on the record.
The record reflects the property was to be
transferred in order "to equalize the marital
assets of the parties."
The court approved the agreement and
requested plaintiffs counsel to prepare an
order reflecting the oral stipulation. Defendant's counsel objected to the prepared order
as it did not indicate the transfer was to
"equalize the marital assets,* language which
was determinative as to the tax consequences
of the agreement. The court therefore set a
hearing on August 8, 1984 to consider the
dispute over the tax language.
The dispute oyer the terms of the agreement
is best understood with reference to federal tax
law. Prior to July 18; 1984, taxation of
marital property settlements depended on the
terms of the court's order or the parties'
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code « Go's Annotation Service
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questions actually asked, we cannot determine
if the trial judge's questions denied plaintiff
the information necessary to challenge biased
jurors for cause.
II
Mr. King assigns as error the trial court's
dismissal of his claim against defendant for
loss of consortium. The trial court dismissed
this claim, holding that Mr. King had failed to
state a cause of action. Our recent decision in
Hackford v. Utah Power & Light, No. 20208
(Utah, June 9, 1987), disposes of this issue.
The trial court properly dismissed Mr. King's
claim.
We affirm.
WE CONCUR:
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice
•Richard C. Howe, Justice
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice
Stewart, Associate Chief Justice,
concurs in the result.
1. Plaintiff has also challenged the jury verdict
finding her one hundred percent negligent. In view
of our holding on the judgment not withstanding
the verdict issue, we do not reach this portion of the
jury's verdict.

-
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Gaylen S. Young, Jr. for Appellant.
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OPINION
ORME, Judge:

~

Sffig'7

concerned.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Catherine Rayburn and Dr.
Rayburn were married in Florida on June 20,
1972. Earlier that same day, Dr. Rayburn had
obtained his medical degree from the University of Florida. At the time, Mrs. Rayburn
had a masters degree in zoology and was
employed as a research associate at the University of Florida. The couple moved to
Houston, Texas where Dr. Rayburn completed
a one year internship at Baylor University. Dr.
Rayburn earned $8,000 to $9,000 during the
internship. Mrs. Rayburn also worked during
that year, earning approximately $7,200. The
couple returned to Florida where Dr. Rayburn
completed a three year residency, earning
approximately $11,000 to $13,500 per year,
Mrs. Rayburn worked for a short time in
Florida, but upon the birth of their first child,
she stopped working full-time and worked
only occassionally, and on a part-time basis,
throughout the rest of the marriage.
After the residency, the family moved to
San Antonio, where Dr. Rayburn completed
two years of military service. During the fiveyear period of the internship, the residency,
and his military service, Dr. Rayburn acted as
the primary financial provider for the family.
Mrs. Rayburn stayed at home, for the most
part, to raise their eventual three children.
After military service, the family moved to
Salt Lake City where Dr. Rayburn joined the
staff of the Primary Children's Medical
Center as a pediatric-anesthesiologist. In
October 1982, Mrs. Rayburn filed for a
divorce.
Trial was held on July 18 and 19, 1983. At
the time of trial, Dr. Rayburn was earning
approximately $125,000 a year. After the two
day trial, the court issued a memorandum
decision. In the decision, the court determined
to award custody of the three minor children,
ages 9, 5, and 2, to Mrs. Rayburn and to
order Dr. Rayburn to pay child support in the
amount of $400 per child per month. Appare n t ^ overlooking the exact sequence of events
on the Rayburns' wedding day, the court
found the husband's medical degree to be a
marital assset and ordered Dr. Rayburn to pay
Mrs. Rayburn $45,000, payable at $750 a
month, as her share of the asset and to
"maintain her lifestyle for a period of adjustment." The decision would have awarded Dr.
Rayburn all of his retirement fund.
About two weeks later, the court issued a
supplemental decision in which the court
altered its earlier decision on the retirement
plan. The court, "in order to make a more
equitable division of property," ordered Dr.
Rayburn to pay one-half the net present
value of the retirement plan, $56,850, to Mrs^
Rayburn in fiwe annual installments of $11,370
plus interest. The court entered Findings of.

In this divorce action, defendant Robert L..
Rayburn appeals the valuation and distribution of a retirement plan and an award of a
$45,000 property. settlement to offset his
medical degree. We affirm the trial court's
basic disposition, but, require amendment of
the decree insofar as the $45.000 award is
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code « Co's Annotation Service
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Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a decree on
September 15, 1983. The decree expressly
awarded no alimony and set December 15,
1983, as the effective date of the divorce.
Dr. Rayburn promptly filed a motion for
relief from judgment or for a new trial. Dr.
Rayburn claimed the trial court failed to
consider the drastic tax consequences of
placing a present value on the retirement plan
and awarding half of that to his wife. The
court took Dr. Rayburn's motion under advisement. On December 9, 1983, the court
issued another memorandum decision. This
decision provided for amendment of the
decree in such terms as would permit the five
retirement plan payments to be treated as
alimony for tax purposes. The court entered a
second set of findings, conclusions, and decree
on February 28, 1984. The second decree
again awarded no alimony as such, made the
embellishment for tax purposes, and set February 28 as the effective date of the divorce.
Dr. Rayburn retained new counsel, who filed a
motion for relief from the new judgment or a
new trial. The court denied the motion and
Dr. Rayburn appealed.
On appeal,.Dr. Rayburn claims the court
erroneously placed a high value on the retirement plan without considering the tax consequences. Dr. Rayburn also claims the court
erred in finding the medical degree to be a
marital asset and placing a value on it without
any supporting evidence.
RECORD ON APPEAL
Dr. Rayburn ordered a transcript on appeal
of only 30 pages, representing a tiny fraction
of the testimony offered at trial. Under Rule
11(e)(2) of the Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals and the predecessor Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, "If the appellant intends
to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion
is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include-in the record
a transcript of all evidence relevant to such
finding or conclusion." Since the transcript
provided by the appellant is insufficient to
allow a review of the evidence to determine
the propriety of the findings, this court
accepts the trial court's Findings of Fact as
true1 and only evaluates the legal correctness
of the two disputed dispositions.2 As indicated, the disputes concern the $45,000 property settlement reflecting Mrs. Ray burn's
"share" of her husband's medical degree and
the payments for Mrs. Rayburn's one-half
interest in the present value of the doctor's
retirement plan. 3
THE MEDICAL DEGREE
Recently this court held that an advanced
degree or professional license is not marital
property subject to division upon divorce.
Petersen v. Petersen, 58 Utah Adv. Rep. 28
(Utah App. May 18, 1987). However, an
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advanced degree often accompanies a disparity
in earning potential that is appropriately
considered as a factor in alimony analysis. See
/d., at 32. We reaffirm our holding in Petersen
and analyze the instant appeal under the same
analysis employed in that case.
The cash settlement of $45,000 payable in
monthly installments of $750 cannot be sustained under Petersen as a property settlement,
but payments of $750 per month for a 5-year
period are properly affirmed as alimony. 4
Criteria considered in determining a reasonable award of support must include the financial conditions and needs of the spouse in
need of support, the ability of that spouse to
produce sufficient income for his or her own
support, and the ability of the other spouse to
provide support. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d
1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). See Paffel v. Paffel,
732 P.2d 96, 100-101 (Utah 1986)(failure to
consider these three factors constitutes an
abuse of discretion). Although characterizing
the monthly payments as a property settlement, the trial court expressly found factors
that readily meet the criteria listed in Jones.
As for Mrs. Rayburn's need for support
and her ability to produce sufficient income,
the trial court found that Mrs. Rayburn was
presently unemployed, but that she had been
employed and was well-educated, having
acquired bachelor's and master's degrees.
However, with minor children residing at
home and not yet in school, Mrs. Rayburn
was reluctant to return immediately to the fulltime workforce. In addition, the court accepted Mrs. Rayburn's testimony that in order
to bring her employment skills to a satisfactory level, she needed to return to school and
obtain further education "to complement her
current education." 5 As for Dr. Rayburn's
ability to provide support, the trial court
found that Dr. Rayburn was well-educated,
having obtained an M.D. degree, and that he
had a successful practice as a pediatricanesthesiologist. earning a projected $125,000
for 1983.
In its first memorandum decision, the trial
court characterized the monthly payments for
Mrs. Rayburn as necessary "to maintain her
life style for a period of adjustment." The 5year period corresponded to the amount of
time it would take for Mrs. Rayburn to complete her additional education on a part-time
basis and until the parties' youngest child was
in school ail day.6
We acknowledge that there will be situations
where an award of non-terminable rehabilitative or reimbursement alimony would be
appropriate. See Petersen v. Petersen, 58 Utah
Adv. Rep. 33. However, this is not such a
case. Dr. Rayburn acquired his medical degree
before the parties were married. Although
Mrs. Rayburn worked periodically during the
marriage, she did not endure substantial financial sacrifices or defer her own education to
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help him obtain the degree. In addition, Mrs.
Rayburn shared the financial rewards permitted by her husband's advanced degree for
several years. Those rewards also resulted in
the accumulation of considerable real and
personal property during their marriage, which
was equitably divided upon their divorce. The
award of temporary alimony, at $750 per
month for a maximum of five years,7 adequately meets Mrs. Rayburn's support needs and
is readily sustainable under the criteria outlined in Jones.
THE RETIREMENT PLAN
Dr. Rayburn's retirement fund was one of
the valuable assets accumulated during the
marriage and was of course subject to equitable division upon divorce. Woodward v.
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1982). See
EnglUt v. Englert, 576 P.2d 1274, 1276
(Utah 1978). We accept the trial court's
finding that the retirement fund's present
value was $113,700. In its second memorandum.decision, the trial court explained that it
had considered several ways to distribute the
wife's share of the retirement fund and found
fixing a sum equal to one-half of the present
value ami distributing that to Mrs. Rayburn as
a cash award to be the most equitable. By
requiring. Mrs* Rayburn's share in the retirement fund to be cashed out following divorce,
the court avoided leaving the parties in a
"financial entanglement that would continue
for approximately twenty or thirty years and
would probably result in further court hearings and cause future animosity between the
parties."
However, the court went on to explain that
"to require the defendant to pay the full sum
at one time would have been an extra
burden." By allowing Dr. Rayburn to make
five annual payments, the court left him the
option of paying his obligation out of current
income or on some other basis, rather than
having to liquidate the fund or sell other
assets. The court additionally softened the
impact by ultimately allowing the payments to
be characterized in such terms as would permit
them to be treated as "alimony" for tax purposes.8
There is admittedly some potential for
confusion because of the measures taken by
the trial court to massage the tax treatment of
the payments to Mrs. Rayburn. However,
these measures were the trial court's response
to Dr. Rayburn's very own argument that the
payments worked a financial hardship on him.
The trial court allowed the payments to be
considered "alimony" for tax'purposes in
order to give Dr. Rayburn the tax break of the
alimony deduction while at the same time
permitting Mrs. Rayburn to be cashed out
within a few years; On appellate review, the
trial court's apportionment of property will
not be disturbed unless it works such a mani-

rest injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear
abuse of discretion. E.g., Turner v. Turner,
649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982). We find no abuse
of discretion in the court's awarding Mrs.
Rayburn a one half interest in the retirement
fund, payable over five years with interest. On
the contrary, and especially with the refinements which were made to address Dr.
Rayburn's concerns about- taxes, the trial
court's approach was clearly fair and equitable.
Accordingly, this case is remanded to the
district court to amend the decree to provide
that Mrs. Rayburn receive $750 per month
alimony for five years and, correspondingly,
to delete the $45,000 cash award. The decree is
otherwise affirmed. Each party shall bear his
or her own costs of appeal.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Russell W. Bench, Judge
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
1. See Sawyers v. Sawyers, 558 P.2d 607, 608 (Utah
1976) ('Appellate review of factual matters can be
meaningful, orderly, and intelligent only in juxtaposition to a record by which lower courts' ruling
and decisions on disputes can be measured."). In
Sawyers, the Supreme Court presumed the findings
of the trial court to have been supported by admissible, competent, substantial evidence. Id. See Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359, 1360-61 (Utah
1974).
2. At oral argument, Dr. Rayburn advised he did
not really intend to question the findings in view of
the evidence, only the propriety of the disposition in
view of the findings.
3. On appeal, Dr. Rayburn also argues that the trial
court erred in filing two separate Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and two separate decrees
with different effective dates. In this regard he relies
heavily on the failure of the second batch of documents to employ the term "amended/ contending
confusion will result about which decree controls.
The second set offindings,conclusions, and decree
was of course prompted by pr. Rayburn's motion
for relief from judgment. Although not expressly
labeled as "amended," the second set of findings,
conclusions, and decree clearly supercedes the first
set and are the direct subject of this appeal.
4. The trial court quite clearly viewed those payments as necessary for support but utilized the property settlement label as a means to preclude their
termination should Mrs. Rayburn remarry. While it
is true that with alimony the receiving spouse may
lose some of his or her award through certain
changed circumstances, like remarriage, Utah Code
Ann. §30-3-5 (1986), it is noted that with installments on a property award, the receiving spouse
might lose some of the award if the paying spouse
obtained a discharge in bankruptcy. By contrast, an
alimony obligation would survive bankruptcy. 11
U.S.C.A. §523 (a)(5) (West Supp. 1987). Characterization of required future payments as hi satisfaction of a marital property disposition, rather than
as alimony, is not always in the best interest of the
receiving' spouse. Cf. Beckmann v. Beckmann, 685
P .2d 1045, 1050 (Utah 1984) (The fact that an inst-
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rument is labeled "property settlement agreement" John B. Maycock for Respondents.
does not necessarily determine whether debt is dischargeable. Court will look at underlying nature of
OPINION
the debt, including whether spouse would be inadequately supported without the "property settleGARFF, Judge:
ment.").
5. This additional education was apparently in the
In March, 1980, Lewis and Betty Berry were
field of computer science. No doubt computeriza- divorced. The trial court awarded appellant
tion has mushroomed in importance in zoology, as Betty, one-half of respondent Lewis' onein nearly every area of scientific endeavor, during third partnership interest in Berry Brothers'
the decade Mrs. Rayburn was unemployed. Computer literacy would greatly enhance Mrs. Raybum's Farms, a family partnership operated as such
since 1957. The court valued this one-half
ability to obtain suitable employment.
6 This rational basis for limiting the payments to a portion of the partnership interest at $42,000,
five-year period of adjustment distinguishes the and allowed Lewis, at his option, to repurccase from Petersen, where we declined to implement hase that interest in monthly payments over
a ten-year cap on alimony otherwise payable where ten years at 12 percent interest. Shortly after
there was no articulated basis for automatically the divorce decree was entered, Betty moved
diminishing the award upon the elapse of ten years. for an amended decree, which was entered on
See Petersen v. Petersen, 58 Utah Adv, Rep. 33. See May 20, 1980. It granted Betty a money judalso Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 567 (Utah 1985).
gment of $42,000 for one-half of the one7. The alimony obligation could terminate earlier
third
interest in Berry Brother's Farms, with
under certain circumstances. Utah Code Ann. §303-5 (1986). In addition, the district court has an option to Lewis to pay this amount over a
' "continuing jurisdiction" to change the alimony ten year period at 12 percent interest. In Berry
award "as is reasonable and necessary," id. (3), v. Berry, 635 P.2d 68, 70 (Utah 1981), the
provided there develops a substantial change in the Supreme Court reversed this amended decree,
parties' circumstances. See, e.g., Naylor v. Naylor, holding that because of the defendant's fina700 P.2d 707, 710 (Utah 1985).
ncial condition, "it is inequitable to award the
8. The trial court did not stop here in tailoring the plaintiff a judgment against the defendant for
provision to make it as painless to Dr, Rayburn as the value of the fractional partnership interest
possible under the circumstances. The Court stated
in its Conclusions of Law: "In the event that the awarded to her, and that it is also inequitable
payments under this paragraph do not qualify as to require him to purchase her interest on the
'alimony' for tax purposes, this would constitute a terms imposed by the trial court/'
change of circumstances entitling the defendant to
The Supreme Court also stated:
come back before the Court and obtain a modificPlaintiff suggests that the judgment
ation reducing this payment to the extent of the
and order of purchase imposed on
income tax which he is required to pay because of
the defendant should not create a
an inability to take a deduction of these payments as
hardship because he may be able to
'alimony'."
persuade the other partners to sever
the real property of the partnership
which consists of approximately
1100 acres of land, and sell the
Cite as
severed portion to satisfy the plai59 Utah Adv. Rep. 45
ntiff's interest. We commend that
suggestion to the defendant but
IN THE
cannot impose it upon him as an
UTAH COURT OF A P P E A L S
obligation inasmuch as under our
partnership laws, §48-l-22(2)(b)
Betty Verdell BERRY,
and (c), U.C.A. 1953, neither plaiPlaintiff and Appellant,
fntiff nor defendant can force a sale
v.
of specific partnership property.
Lewis Dale BERRY, Wallace Berry, and Rial
/d.at70.
Berry, dba Berry Brother's Farms, a
Betty attempted, a second time, to force
partnership,
liquidation in August, 1981, when she moved
Defendants and Respondents.
to modify the decree, requesting the court to
Before Judges Garff, Jackson and Billings.
award a money judgment in the property of
the family partnership or liquidate the partnNo. 860014-CA
ership assets of the defendant's one-third
FILED: June 8, 1987
interest. The trial court found no change of
circumstances and refused to liquidate the
FOURTH DISTRICT
partnership assets or enter a money judgment.
Hon. J. Robert Bullock
Betty brought this third independent action
in July 1983, against Lewis, his partners
ATTORNEYS:
Wallace and Rial Berry, and their, partnership,
Richard B. Johnson for Appellant.
Berry Brothers' Farms. The action was
brought to enforce the divorce decree in which
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult CodetCo's Annotation Service
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native, to remand the matter with instructions
to the trial court to enter specific findings of j
!
fact.
The Utah Supreme Court decision in Jones
v. Jones, 700 P.2d .1072 (Utah 1985), which
was followed by this Court in Boyle v. Boyle,
735 P.2d 669 (Utah App. 1987), is controlling
in the instant case. In Jones, the findings of
the trial court merely described the property
awarded to each party and failed to assign any
specific or cumulative values. The Utah
Supreme Court held although the trial court
has a broad latitude of discretion in orders
concerning property distribution, "the trial
court must exercise its discretion in accordance
with the standards that have been set by this
Court." Jones, 700 P.2d at 1074. One of those
standards is the "findings of fact must include
valuation of assets in order to permit appellate
review." Boyle, 735 P.2d at 671.
The Jones Court attempted to compensate
for the lack of findings by reviewing the
record for evidence of the values. However,
the Court noted such "examination reveals
that the valuation of the most important assets
was hotly disputed by the parties. If the trial
court accepted one set of values, the wife was
clearly awarded too little; if another set was
adopted, it is possible that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion." Jones, 700 P.2d at
1074.
In Jones and Boyle, the Utah Supreme
Court and this Court both ruled that despite
the requirement of specific findings, the appellants in both cases waived their claims since
they were the parties who prepared the original findings. Failing to prepare the findings to
include values, they therefore waived challenges on appeal. In the instant case, respondent
plaintiff, not appellant defendant, prepared
the findings. Therefore, the Jones exception
does not apply.
In the instant case, as in Jones, the valuation of the most important assets is hotly
disputed. If the trial court accepted one set of
values, defendant was clearly awarded too
little; if another set was adopted, the division
could be equitable. Without specific findings
of the values, we are unable to determine
whether the trial court distributed the property
equitably. We therefore remand for findings
on the specific values of the assets.
On remand, one of the key assets to be
valued is Diana, Inc., the family business
awarded to defendant. At trial, both parties
testified the amount of money earned by and
deposited into the account of Diana, Inc.
during 1983 was approximately $750,000.00 to
$1,000,000.00. At about the time the parties
separated, defendant closed all the corporate
accounts and thereafter ceased all record
keeping. Defendant testified that although
Diana, Inc. was once a profitable business, at
the time of trial, it had a net worth of negative $50,400.00.Plaintiff, unable to show
For complete Utah Code Annotations,
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current value due to defendant's failure to
keep records, did present some evidence of
defendant's mismanagement and large expenditures of corporate funds. In its findings,
the trial court expressed concern that defendant had failed to fully disclose the
company's true value.
Assets are usually valued at the time of the
divorce decree. Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d
695, 697 (Utah 1985); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615
P.2d 1218, 1223 (Utah 1980). However, where
one party has dissipated an asset, hidden its
value, or otherwise acted obstructively, the
trial court may, under its broad discretion,
value the property at an earlier date, i.e.,
separation. In re Marriage of Priddis, 132 Cal.
App. 3d 349, 183 Cal. Rptr. 37, 39 (1982); In
re Marriage of Stallcup, 97 Cal. App. 3d 294,
158 Cal. Rptr. 679, 682 (1979). In view of the
evidence adduced at trial, the trial court might
therefore value Diana, Inc. as of the time the
parties separated in November, 1983.
Remanded. No costs awarded.
Russell W. Bench, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
1. Defendant blamed the drastic reduction of value
on recent repossessions and theft of most of his
company vehicles and equipment, resulting in the
loss of all major contracts.
• • - -
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OPINION
BENCH, Judge:
- 'Defendant appeals the property division,
alimony award, and attorney fees award in a
onsult Code tCo's Annotation Service
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decree of divorce. We affirm the property
division and the award of alimony, but we
reverse the award of attorney fees.
Plaintiff Donna S. Talley and defendant
Glenn E. Talley were married on June 14,
1968. On December 14, 1983, plaintiff filed a
complaint for divorce.
At trial on August 27, 1984, the court received evidence in the form of testimony and
exhibits regarding the value of the marital
assets, alimony, and attorney fees. The court
issued a memorandum of decision on September 4, 1984. In its decision the court assigned values and distributed the marital property by awarding plaintiff, among other items,
the parties' home, her personal property, and
a portion of the furniture and fixtures in the
home. The court awarded defendant, among
other items, a boat, various stock, his retirement plan, his personal property, and a
portion of the furniture and fixtures in the
home. The court also awarded alimony and
attorney fees to plaintiff. The court filed its
formal findings, conclusions and decree on
November 14,1984.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial
court erred in disproportionately assigning
values to marital assets with insufficient evidence.
Determining and assigning values to marital
property is a matter for the trial court, and
this Court will not disturb those determinations absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion. Yelderman v. Yelderman, 669 P.2d 406
(Utah 1983); Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6
(Utah 1982). While defendant has concededly
shown that the trial court valued certain items
of marital property either contrary to or in the
absence of his testimony, he has failed to
show how this constitutes an abuse of discretion. We therefore affirm the disposition of
the marital property.
,
Defendant next argues the trial court erred
in awarding alimony to plaintiff. Defendant
argues the testimony and evidence at trial
failed to demonstrate plaintiffs actual need
for alimony.
The purpose of alimony is to "enable the
receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as
possible the standard of living enjoyed during
the marriage and to prevent the spouse from
becoming a public charge". Eames v. Eames,
735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah App. 1987) (citing Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah
1986)). This Court will not interfere with an
award of alimony absent a showing of-a clear
and prejudicial abuse of discretion. Id.
In Eames, this Court reiterated the three
factors, previously adopted by the Utah
Supreme Court, that the trial court must
consider in awarding alimony: 1) the financial
condition and needs of the receiving spouse, 2)
the ability of the receiving spouse to produce a
•;• sufficient income for himself or herself, and 3)
the ability of the paying spouse to provide

PZ^

support. Id.; see also Boyle v. Boylet 735 P.2d
669 (Utah App. 1987).
In the instant case, the parties were married
for fifteen years. At the time of the divorce,
plaintiff netted approximately $953.00 per
month from her employment, while defendant
earned approximately $2,018.00 net per
month. Plaintiff testified her monthly expenses
totaled $1,320.00. She asked for $500.00 per
month permanent alimony. The court awarded
her $250.00 per month for the first two years
and $150.00 per month for the following three
years. The record is clear the court considered,
the required factors, and we therefore affirm
the award of alimony.
Defendant finally argues the trial court's
award of plaintiffs attorney fees was in error
as the court failed to address the reasonableness of the fees requested by plaintiffs
counsel.
"In divorce cases, an award of attorney fees
must be supported by evidence that it is reasonable in amount and reasonably needed by
the party requesting the award." Huck v.
Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1986). Although plaintiff sufficiently demonstrated reasonable financial need, she failed to present
evidence of the reasonableness of the fee requested. At the close of plaintiffs case, her
counsel proffered testimony and produced an
exhibit itemizing the time and costs expended
by him, his associate, and his clerk, and the
hourly rates charged for each. Conspicuously
absent is any evidence "regarding the necessity
of the number of hours dedicated, the reasonableness of the rate charged in light of the
difficulty of the case and the result accomplished, and the rates commonly charged for
divorce actions in the community ...." Kerr v.
Kerr, 610P.2d 1380, 1384-85 (Utah 1980).
Because plaintiff failed in her burden of
establishing the reasonableness of the attorney
fees requested, we reverse the award of attorney fees. Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862 (Utah
1984); Delatore v. Delatore, 680 P.2d 27 (Utah
1984).
Affirmed in part, reversed irr part. Parties
to bear their own costs.
Russell W. Bench, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Debbie A. LEE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Dennis V. LEE,
Defendant and Respondent.
Before Judges Billings, JacksGn, and
Davidson.
No. 860143-CA
FILED: November 10, 1987
SEVENTH DISTRICT
Honorable Boyd Bunnell
ATTORNEYS:
Michael A. Harrision for Appellant.
John E. Schindler for Respondent.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
The wife appeals from the property distribution and alimony provisions of the decree of
divorce. She contends the trial court abused its
discretion by not awarding her an equitable
share of the marital assets, and in fixing
alimony at $1.00 per year. We agree, and,
therefore, reverse and remand.
I.

Code • Co
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D & D, the primary income-producing asset
of the marriage. The husband worked for D &
D for the duration of the marriage. The wife
performed clerical duties for D & D during the
marriage, including paying monthly bills,
answering phones, and typing. The wife was
not compensated for her services for over
three years. 1
At trial, the valuation of D & D and its
distribution as a marital asset were the main
issues. A financial statement, dated February
I, 1985, signed by the husband, and submitted
by him to Zions First National Bank, was
admitted into evidence. This statement listed
the total assets of D & D as $521,389, the
total iiabiiites as $65,966, for a net worth of
$455,423. The wife also testified that as of the
Wednesday before the trial commenced, the
balance in D & D's checking account was
$57,846. The husband called Marvin Mutz, a
bookkeeper who prepared the year-end tax
reports of D & D, to testify on the value of
the company. A financial statement prepared
by Mutz showed the total net worth of D & D
as $112,397.34. The husband testified that the
real property of the business had a value of
$40,000, making the total net worth of D & D
assets, according to the husband, $152,397.34.
Mutz also estimated the value of the
husband's 52 percent ownership of D & D
stock to be $33,528. Mutz's estimation of the
value of the husband's 52 percent interest in
D & D was based upon the husband's percentage of total authorized shares (100,000), and
not upon total issued shares (40,000). If the
value of the husband's 52 percent interest in
D & D had been based upon issued shares, the
value of his stock, according to his own
expert's testimony, would be $83,820,00.2
At the time of trial, the wife, had a high
school education, and was currently unemployed despite her efforts at seeking employment.
The trial court awarded the wife assets
valued at $19,000. The court awarded the 52
percent interest in D & D exclusively to the
husband, without assigning any value to the
company, together with other assets valued at
$3,500. The wife was awarded $1.00 per year
in alimony.
Two issues are raised on appeal. First, did
the trial court deny the wife her equitable
share of marital assets by refusing to place a
value on D & D to allow a cash distribution to
the wife, or, if it was unable to assign a value,
by failing to make an in-kind distribution of
the stock to her? Second, did the trial court
abuse its discretion in fixing the alimony
award at $ 1.00 per year?

FACTS
Debbie Lee ("the wife") and Dennis Lee
("the husband") were married for almost nine
years, from December 9, 1976 until July 25.
1985. At the time of the marriage, the wife
was employed, primarily performing clerical
functions. Shortly after the marriage, the wife
quit her job at her husband's request. The
wife's premarital property was minimal. At
the time of the marriage, the husband was the
General Mine Foreman of Valley Camp
Company/Prior to the marriage, the husband
and his brother established a garbage collection business, in which the husband made a
substantial monetary investment from personal
assets. Subsequent to the parties' marriage,
the husband and his brother sold the garbage
business and established D & D Equipment
and Supply ("D & D"), a corporation involved
in the coal industry. The husband owned 52
percent of the shares of D & D. The
husband's premarital assets consisted of a D8
cat (tractor), a 1973 Buick automobile, a 1972
II.
pickup truck, and an $18,000 certificate of
deposit.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
During the marriage the parties had two
In divorce proceedings, the trial court has
children, purchased a mobile home and other considerable discretion in adjusting the finaminor assets, and continued the operation of
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code • Co's Annotation Service

C o d e * Co
provo. Utah

69 UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

53

ncial and property interests of the parties. half of the husband's interest in a closely held
Argyle v. Argyle, 68$ P.2d 468, 470 (Utah family ranch. The trial court relied on recent
1984). The "determination of the value of the financial statements prepared by the corporaassets is a matter for the trial court which will tion for the Production Credit Administration
not be reviewed in the absence of a clear abuse to determine the value of the corporation.
of discretion." Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6, After deducting from that amount the value of
8 (Utah 1982) (citations omitted). However, a gift the husband received from his mother,
the trial court must make findings on ail the court halved the balance to determine the
material issues, and its failure to do so cons- husband's interest and halved the figure again
titutes reversible error unless the facts in the to reach the wife's marital cash share of the
record are "clear, uncontroverted, and capable property. This approach was affirmed by the
of supporting only a finding in favor of the Utah Supreme Court, where it found that the
judgment." Acton v. Deliran, 131 P.2d 996, value of stock can be measured by the net
999 (Utah 1987). The findings must be suffi- worth of the underlying assets. Id.; see
ciently detailed and consist of enough subsid- Johnson v. Johnson, 674 P.2d 539, 544 (Okla.
iary facts to reveal the steps the court took to j 1983) (value of stock could be computed based
reach its conclusion on each factual issue ! upon a financial statement).
presented. Id.
!
Both parties introduced financial statements
reflecting the total net worth of D & D's
rii.
j assets. The wife submitted a financial statment
dated February 1, 1985, prepared for Zions
DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL ASSETS
The wife contends the trial court erred in j First National Bank. This statement showed
refusing to assign a value to the husband's 52 j the net worth of D & D assets as $455,423.
percent in D & D, a marital asset, and in The husband also submitted a financial stateawarding it exclusively to the husband. We ment through . Marvin Mutz, a bookkeeper
agree. The lower court, in its findings, states | who prepared D & D's year-end tax reports.
that "[b]ased on the evidence presented to the This statement showed the total net worth of
court at trial the court refuse[s] to place a D & D as $112,397.34. The husband then
value on the parties['] share of the corpora- ! testified that the value of the real property of
tion .... [T]he market value of business cannot j D & D was $40,000, making the total net
be determined from the evidence presented."
j worth of D & D, according to the husband,
A wife is entitled to a fair and equitable \ $152,397.34. Further, Marvin Mutz testified
share of the financial benefits accumulated by that the value of the husband's 52 percent
virtue of the parties' joint efforts during the interest in D & D stock was $33,528. In
marriage. See Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d j making this estimation, if Mutz had used the
1201, 1204 (Utah 1983). D & D was establi- number of total issued shares (40,000), rather
shed after the parties' marriage, and its value i than total authorized shares (100,000), to
calculate the value per share, the husband's 52
was actualized during the marriage.
The wife assisted in the operation of the percent interest in D & D would be valued at
corporation by assuming clerical duties, incl- $83,820.00.
Applying Argyle, the trial court could have
uding typing, answering the phones, and
paying bills. Moreover, the wife* also reared assigned a value to D & D. The trial court
the parties' two children and performed could then have determined 52 percent of the
domestic duties, allowing the husband to company as representing the husband's inteparticipate full-time in the business. There- rest, subtracted any premarital contribution by
fore, she is entitled to a fair and equitable the husband, and halved the remainder to
share of D & D. The trial court's award of reach the wife's marital cash share of the
the 52 percent interest in D & D, the principal corporation.
If the trial court, because of the great disasset of the marriage, exclusively to the
husband without any findings as to its value parity of testimony, was unable to assign a
constitutes a clear abuse of discretion.
i value to D & D, then the court could have
Alternative avenues were available to the made an in-kind distribution of D & D stock
trial court to award the wife her equitable i to the wife. This alternative was affirmed by
v. Savage,
share of D & D. First, the trial court could the Utah Supreme Court in Savage
3
658
P.2d
1201
(Utah
1983).
The
supreme
have valued the husband's 52 percent interest
in D & D based on the financial statements court, while acknowledging that whenever
and testimony submitted by the parties. The possible continued joint ownership by divorced
court could then have awarded the wife an spouses of closely held corporate stock should
equitable portion of D & D by way of off- be avoided, agreed that the trial court had
setting property, or a cash distribution payable "virtually no alternative to an in-kind distr-',
over a period of time. This alternative was ibution of Savage stock" because of the widely
sanctioned by the Utah Supreme Court in conflicting valuations. Savage, 658 P.2d at
Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468 (Utah 1984). 1204.
In the case at hand, the trial court decided
In Argyle, the trial court awarded the wife onenot to award the wife a percentage of the
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code •Co's Annotation Service
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stock held by the husband because "D & D is
controlled by the husband, and the possibility
of ever receiving a dividend or establishing a
market value for the stock would be extremely
remote." While this observation may be true,
we find that to award' the wife nothing is
patently unjust.
Due to the trial court's failure to value D &
D stock or to award the wife her equitable
share of the stock in D & D, a marital asset,
we reverse and remand this case to the district
court for further proceedings. On remand, the
district court shall award the wife her equitable share of the corporation, whether it be a
cash settlement or an in-kind distribution, set
forth findings to support its decision, and
enter judgment accordingly.
IV.
/"* "• ' ALIMONY
/ The wife's second objection to the decree of
/divorce is that the trial court abused its discr e t i o n in determining the amount of alimony
/ by failing to adequately consider the factors
/ set forth in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072,
/ 1079 (Utah 1985). We agree.
J
The propose of anmony is to "PTONI&S
' support for the wife as nearly as possible at
/ the standard of living she enjoyed during
/ marriage, and to prevent the wife from beco|
ming a public charge." English v. English, 565
j
P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977). In fixing alimony
I
awards, three factors must be considered: (1)
»
the financial conditions and needs of the
l
spouse; (2) the ability of the spouse to produce
{
sufficient income for herself; and, (3) the
j
ability of the paying spouse to provide
!
support. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1079
j
(Utah 1985) (citations omitted). After a careful
j
review of the record, we find no support or
explanation for the $1.00 per year alimony
I
award.
The wife is currently unemployed. She was
fired from her job at D & D. She has not
j
found employment despite her persistent
t
efforts. The wife was awarded no incomei
producing assets or cash. She now must incur
the expense of moving the mobile home currently situated on the husband's mother's
I
property, in addition to incurring her ordinary
I
Vrvmg expenses.
The wife was married at the age of 20 with
j
a high school education and clerical skills. She
1
terminated her former employment at her
I
husband's request. During the marriage, the
wife devoted her time to raising the couple's
\
two children and working for D & D.
1
At trial the husband testifed that he had
1
made $1,800 per month for the'four, years
I
preceding the divorce. Moreover, the husband
•A -was awarded D & D, an lncomerproducing
V asset. However, the record indicates that the
\ income generated by D & D had been deciiY ning, given the depressed conditions of the
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coal market.
The trial court made no findings of fact to
support its award of $1.00 per year alimony as
required by Acton y. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996,
999 (Utah 1987). Therefore, we reverse and
remand for the trial court to fix the alimony
award in light of the three factors articulated
in Jones, in addition to distributing to the wife
her equitable share of the marital assets.
Reversed and remanded. Costs awarded to
appellant.
Judith M. Billings, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
1. In a temporary order, entered .July 30, 1984, the
trial court, in ruling on temporary alimony, ordered
the husband to maintain the wife as an employee of
D & D, rather than have the husband pay the wife
temporary alimony.
2. Computed as follows:
$152,397.34 divided by 40,000 shares = $3.81 per
share
The husband has 22000 shares at $3.81 per share
= $83,820.
3. A.s Jvisxice Stewart sX&tss v\ his, opposiucm to aa
in-kind distribution of stock in divorce actions: "a
better approach than the distribution in kind ...
would be to remand [the] case for a determination
by the trial judge of the actual value of the corporation!.]" He believes *[t]hat task is no different, or
more difficult, than the same task which must be
performed in most tort cases, contract cases, and
property cases where an award of damages is
made." Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1206
(Stewart, J. dissenting).
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was not subject to exact determination, as was
demonstrated by three experts who disagreed
as to its size. Therefore, the judge erred in
judicially noticing the size of the property and
failing.to submit that issue to the jury.
.
However, we must also consider whether or
not the error was prejudicial. An "error or
defect in any ruling or order or in anything
done or omitted by the court7' shall be disregarded unless it affects the substantial rights '
of the parties. Utah R. Civ. P. 61. Such error
is harmless unless it probably would have had
a "substantial influence in bringing about a
different verdict." Redevelopment Agency v.
Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296, 1303-04 (Utah 1987);
Hill v. Hartog, 658 P.2d 1206, 1208 (Utah
1983); Gillmor v. Gillmor, 657 P.2d 736, 743
(Utah 1982). In reviewing such an error, the
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable
to the jury verdict. Hill, 658 P.2d at 1209.
In the case before this court one expert
testified that the property was 33,129 square I
feet, another that it was between 33,000 and ;
34,000 square feet and a third that it was I
31,423 square feet. The judge's estimate that
the property was close to 32,000 square feet
falls within the experts' estimates. Therefore, I
the jury's award could have been based on the I
experts' testimony as easily as that of the I
judge. Viewing the evidence in the light most j
favorable to the verdict, we find the judge's
error in judicially noticing the size of the
property rather than submitting the issue to
the jury to be harmless error, as the evidence
properly admitted at trial independently supports the jury verdict.

award is not higher than the total amount
actually awarded. We therefore reject defendant's claim for attorney fees.
Affirmed.
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
Russell W. Bench, Judge
1. Keith S. Jones did not join in this appeal and did
not request moving expenses at trial.
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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
David L. CANNING,
Plaintiff and Respondent/
'•

v .
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Caleen S. CANNING,
Defendant and Appellant.
Before Judges Jackson, Davidson and
Greenwood.
No. 860016-CA
FILED: October 16, 1987

THIRD DISTRICT
Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin
ATTORNEYS:
III.
I Brian M. Barnard for Appellant.
Defendant's third claim on appeal is that I Lewis B. Quigley for Respondent.
the trial court erred in refusing to allow
OPINION
moving costs for defendant's business and
f a m i l y . / U t a h Code A n n , §11-1923.9(2)(1986) provides that a jury may award a JACKSON, Judge:
The parties herein were both granted a
reasonable sum as compensation for the costs
and expenses of relocating the owner whose divorce in a June 28, 1983 decree that distriproperty is acquired or a party conducting a buted only a few items of personal property.
business on the property. Since the statute is All other issues were taken under advisement.
permissive, it is within the discretion of the The proceedings were finalized by an amended
jury to determine allowable compensation. We judgment entered February 14, 1984. The
find the jury's award of $18,300 to be reaso- assets of the parties were divided almost
nable and affirm that award.
equally. Mr. Canning was ordered to pay
about $6,000.00 of personal and joint obligations and $350.00 monthly for support of two
Defendant's final claim is that under Utah minor sons (issue of a prior marriage of the
Code Ann. §11-19-23.9 (1986) she is ent- parties). Alimony was denied. On appeal, Mrs.
itled to attorney fees. Section 11-19-23.9 Canning challenges the distribution of propstates that a court may award attorney fees if erty, the amount of child support, and the
the jury or trier of fact awards more to a denial of alimony. We affirm the distribution
property owner than the original offer of the of assets and obligations and the child support
condemning agency. Defendant claims that if award. We reverse the amended judgment on
the 'award of $128,000 is calculated on a the issue of alimony and remand for additisquare footage basis, it is greater than" the onal findings and possible modification..
condemning"agency's offerqf$150,000.
j
AIJ^NY
We -find appellant's c^
First, the^ statute is permissive. Second, >the : 0 n this -case,; the denial of alimony was a
dear abuse of discretion because the record
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does not reveal that the court considered or
made any finding of Mrs. Canning's current
or future ability to work. Higley v. Higley,
676 P.2d 379 (Utah 1983). Higley was decided
on December 19, 1983, while the Canning
findings were being finalized; its ramifications
were not addressed in the briefs of either party
to this appeal. Here, the trial court found only
that "Plaintiff [David Canning] had biweekly gross income of $1,019.00, and Defendant [Caleen Canning] was unemployed" at
the time of trial (Finding of Fact No. 3) and
that "Defendant should be awarded no
alimony" (Finding of Fact No. 7).
The purpose and objective of alimony have
been described in a framework of several
decisions. The cornerstone is language in
English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977),
adopted from another jurisdiction:
The standard utilized by the trial
court, viz., the length of the marriage and the contributions of each
to their joint financial success, is
•not an appropriate measure to determine alimony. There is a distinction between the division of assets
accumulated during marriage, which
should be distributed upon an
equitable basis, and the post- .
marital duty of support and maintenance.
The purpose of alimony is to
provide support for the wife and
not to inflict punitive damages on
the husband. Alimony is not intended as a penalty against the
husband nor a reward to the wife
In Nace v. Nace, [107 Ariz. 411,
489 P.2d 48, 50 (1971),] the court
stated that the most important
function of alimony is to provide
support for the wife as nearly as
possible at the standard of living
she enjoyed during marriage, and to
prevent the wife from becoming a
public charge. The court observed
that criteria considered in determining a reasonable award for support
and maintenance include the financial conditions and needs of. the
wife, the ability of the wife to
produce a sufficient income for
herself; [sic] and the ability of the
husband to provide support.
Id. at 411-12 (citations omitted). See Jones v.
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); Jeppson v. Jeppson, 684 P.2d 69, 70 (Utah
1984).1 Failure to consider the three factors
enunciated in English constitutes an abuse of
the lower court's discretion. Paffel v. Paffel,
732P.2d96,101 (Utahl986),;
Mr. Canning earned almost $28,000 annually as a Mountain Bell repairman during each

17

of the two calendar years prior to the divorce.
He had seventeen years of tenure with his
company. Mrs. Canning had earned about
$1,200 during the prior year. She had only a
high school education and insignificant job
skills to market. Her off-and-on work was
always in the minimum wage category. Her
ability to work was impaired by an ulcer and
by the disabilities of their minor sons. Both
were handicapped by learning dysfunctions;
one was being treated by a psychologist for
emotional problems. She was seeking a flexible
work schedule so she could devote necessary
time to their special needs. It is doubtful that
she could find and keep a full-time job. Even
if able to do so, her earnings would be
minimal for an extended period.
Mr. Canning claimed necessary monthly
living expenses amounting to $350 more than
Mrs. Canning claimed for herself and the two
sons. We note that he was paying an identical
amount, i.e. $350, as child support under a
temporary order, later made permanent by the
decree. Mr. - Canning's annual gross income
will be about $24,000 after deducting child
support (assuming no increase in salary). The
disparity between his annual income of
$24,000 and her $1,200 plus $4,200 child
support is striking, even though he was
ordered to pay $3,306 of marital debts and
$3,212 of debts incurred by him after the
parties separated.
The denial of alimony to Caleen Canning
creates a great disparity in future annual
incomes and the parties' respective standards
of living, a situation remarkably similar to
that created by the lower court's meager
alimony award in Higley. David Canning's
standard of living will be much closer to what
it was during the marriage than will appellant's. When the above considerations are
coupled with the absence of any finding about
Mrs. Canning's ability to work or her earning
capacity, the trial court's failure to award
alimony is a clear and prejudicial abuse of
discretion. Although this Court has the power
to modify the decree accordingly, the lack of
necessary findings in the record prevents us
from doing so. Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d at
382.
.; : ,;,, f [ .^s
The decree appears to contemplate that
appellant would obtain work and earn income
sufficient to support herself and the parties'
children. Without specific factual findings to
that effect, she is left without a baseline for
future modification purposes if she does not in I
fact obtain ongoing, income-producing work.
See id. at 382 & n. 1. On the other hand, if
she does obtain any such work (as long as the
baseline is the present zero), that income will
reflect improved ^circumstances to her" detriment.^ She should notf be thus" pe^
Vleast until she exceeds the baseline amount
which the decree contemplates she will earn,
an amount which would have to be sufficient
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to provide the necessities of life.
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION
The trial court and counsel were perplexed
about the effect of the first (almost seventeen
year) marriage and divorce of the parties upon
their second (twenty month) marriage and
divorce. The proceedings became bifurcated to
determine how the on-again off-again relationship of the parties should influence the
distribution of property and the provisions for
support and maintenance.
During this interim in the decision-making
process, counsel submitted simultaneous
memoranda to the court. Respondent's
memorandum was submitted "in support of
his position that for purposes of determining
alimony and allocating [respondent]'s pension
and stock benefits only the period of the
parties' remarriage should be considered."
Appellant's memorandum was submitted
" regarding the effect of a re-marriage on the
parties' rights and the [appellant]'s claim
upon the plaintiff's retirement benefits/
Respondent summarized that "only the period
of the parties' second marriage (twenty
months) should be considered for purposes of
determining alimony or allocation of employment benefits/ Appellant concluded that
"this Court should consider the marriage relationship of these parties in toto and make a
fair award of support and alimony and a
division of all assets based upon a marriage of
eighteen and a half years during which the
parties acquired as substantial assets both a
home and retirement benefits." The court
thereafter recorded its oral ruling on a minute
entry form with a handwritten sheet attached.
The sheet contains the following paragraph:
Court finds the marriage to be
considered in this action is only the
marriage of January 1981. The
pension and stock benefit rights
come into the marriage as the sole
p r o p e r t y and rights of Mr.
Canning. Wife has retained all she
brought into the marriage. Value of
pension/retirement fund Court
finds is $2,542.00 as of date of
trial.
Four months later, the following typed minute
entry was entered:
Memorandum ruling on divorce
matters not previously ruled upon.
In this case divorce has been
granted and several other matters
decided and ruled upon. As to the
remaining matters for ruling:
1. Oral ruling as to pension is not
binding upon the court and the
court awards defendant 1/2 of the
cash value of the pension plan; 1/2
of the cash value being $1271.00,
total cash value found to be $2542.

2. Defendant having custody of the
minor children, Plaintiff is to pay
as support the sum of $175.00 per
month per child. Defendant may
claim youngest child as dependent
for tax purposes. Plaintiff may
claim older child. Child support to
be paid 1/2 by 5th day of each
month and 1/2 by 20th day [sic]
month.
3. Plaintiff to pay marital debts and
obligations outstanding and his own
debts and obligations and hold her
harmless.
4. Life insurance on plaintiff to be
in force and effect with children as
beneficiaries until children attain
their majority. Amount of insurance to be kept in effect need not
exceed $15,000 each child. (Court is .
aware that in event of death of
father certain social security benefits would be available to children.)
5. Plaintiff to maintain health,
dental, optical insurance as available through his employer, for
children, and he is to pay 1/2 of
costs that exceed the insurance
benefits payable; cosmetic dental,
etc., is not to be paid by either
party unless they agree to share
such cost.
6. The 1982 income tax refunds
should be divided 50/50.
7. Balance of proceeds from sale of
house to be divided equally. Note:
marital obligations are to be paid
by Mr. Canning, plaintiff, and he is
to pay Credit Union and J. C.
Penney bills he incurred.
8. Plaintiff awarded the stock share
plan benefits.
9. Decree has been entered previously, awarding divorce.
10. Matter of child custody, visitation, previously ruled upon.
11. Distribution of personal property has previously been ruled upon.
12. Attorney's fees have been ruled
upon.
The underlying premise of Mrs. Canning's
appeal is that in "the final decree ... the Court
considered only the second (21 month) marriage of the parties and did not consider the
first (16+ year) marriage of the parties." We
have searched both the decree of divorce and
amended judgment in vain. Neither of those
documents nor the final findings upon which
they are based contain any such language or
compel any such inference.
' -h-;•'•
The subsequent action taken and final dis-
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position made by the court also do not demonstrate that the court operated in a rigid
compartment of time. Otherwise, there would
not have been an award of child support since
the minor sons were not issue of the marriage
being dissolved. Furthermore, if the trial judge
was only taking into account the parties*
second, brief marriage, Mrs. Canning would
not have been awarded 1/2 of the pension
fund that had accrued primarily during their
first marriage.
We recognize that a district judge faces a
difficult task in almost every divorce action.
"The court's responsibility is to endeavor to
provide a just and equitable adjustment of
their economic resources so that the parties
can reconstruct their lives on a happy and
useful basis/ Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79,
83, 296 P.2d 977, 979 (1956). In the more
recent case of Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d
1218, 1222 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme
Court stated:
There is no fixed formula upon
which to determine a division of
properties, [sic] it is a prerogative
of the court to make whatever disposition of property as it deems
fair, equitable, and necessary for
the protection and welfare of the
parties. In the division of marital
property, the trial judge has wide
discretion, and his*findings will not
be disturbed unless the record ind-'
icates an abuse thereof.
The allocations of the Cannings' assets and
liabilities by the trial court reveal a determined
effort to place the parties in comparable economic positions. We cannot fault that effort
and outcome, except as indicated above in our
disposition of the alimony issue. Wrhile equality is a worthy goal, precise mathematical
equality is not essential or required. See, for
example, Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695 (Utah
1985). where sixty percent of the value of the
assets was awarded to the wife, and Turner v.
Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982), where the
wife received twenty-seven percent of the
assets (her calculation) or forty-two percent
(his calculation).
Mrs. Canning argues that the home became
her sole and separate property after the
parties' first divorce and remained so after
they remarried. Although the house (acquired
during the first marriage) was awarded to Mrs.
Canning in the first divorce, it was subject to
a $15,000 lien in favor of Mr. Canning and to
a first mortgage. After remarriage, the parties
jointly borrowed additional funds against the
home which were used for their personal and
mutual benefit, including improvements on the
home and purchase of personal property
which was later awarded to her.
In any event, the parties stipulated to a sale
of the home during the pendency of this
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divorce action. Three months before trial, they
closed a sale and partially distributed the
proceeds-over $11,000 to him and over
$11,000 to her. Then they filed a stipulation
and agreement with the court which recited
that they had sold the home and had "in part
distributed the proceeds/ They agreed that
additional proceeds from the sale be held until
further order of the trial court. The court
subsequently distributed the remaining funds
in accordance with its memorandum ruling
recited above. In view of all the circumstances
described, we cannot say that the district court
abused its discretion concerning the home sale
proceeds. "A trial court's apportionment of
marital property will not be disturbed unless it
works such a manifest injustice or inequity as
to indicate a clear abuse of discretion." Turner
v. Turner, 649 P.2d at 8.
Mrs. Canning next contends that she did not
receive an equitable share of Mr. Canning's
retirement benefits. She does not challenge the
50/50 splil; she contends that the trial court
erred in accepting the value calculated by
respondent's expert instead of the higher value
calculated by her expert. However, "it is
within the province of the fact findeT to
believe those witnesses or evidence it chooses/
Yelderman v; Yelderman, 669 P.2d 406, 408
(Utah 1983). The value of the retirement
benefits as found by the trial court is substantiated by the record, and we will not disturb
it on appeal. Id. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).
Appellant tried her case on the basis that the
value of the retirement benefits could be ascertained. She never suggested to the trial court
that they were incapable of valuation at the
time of trial, thereby requiring use of the
deferred distribution method enunciated in
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah
1982). Although she may now prefer the Woodward approach, we will not address this
issue for the first- time on appeal. See Utility
Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Fake, 62 Utah Adv. Rep.
7, 8 (1987); Insley Mfg. Corp. v. Draper Bank
& Trust, 111 P.2d 1341,1347 (Utah 1986).
CHILD SUPPORT
Appellant's final challenge on appeal is to
the level of child support awarded. In her
complaint, Mrs. Canning sought $200 per
month per child, for a total monthly request
of $400. The court considered the needs of the
children, as well as the relative abilities of the
parties to meet them, and ordered Mr.
Canning to pay $175 per month per child, for
a total monthly award of $350. The monthly
$50 difference between what she requested and
what she received can hardly be characterized
as an abuse of discretion. We will not secondguess the award. See Jorgenson v. Jorgenson,
667 P.2d 22,23 (Utah 1983).
The judgment of the court below is affirmed
as to property distribution and child support.
That portion of the judgment awarding no
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aiimony to appellant is reversed, and the
matter is remanded to the trial court for
additional findings of fact and possible modification of the judgment. Costs to appellant.
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
1. For more expansive lists of criteria see MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066,
1C70 (1951) and Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79,
296 P.2d 977, 979-80 (1956).
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tion by Champh'n. As such, he primarily
worked alone in a job that had the potential
for emergency, life-threatening situations
requiring fast and efficient handling to avoid
injury to persons or property. Charnplin's
schedule required him to work erratic hoursseven evening shifts before two days off, then
six daylight shifts and two days off, followed
by seven morning shifts and four days off.
Robinson's work performance was never criticized as inadequate or improper by either
employer.
Robinson had a history of mental disturbances of varying degrees of severity dating
back to 1975. In 1982, Robinson was diagnosed as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, a condition for which he was treated
with medication. Records of his treatment for
these disturbances were in his file at Champlin. At the hearing before the administrative
law judge, he described the 1982 episode as an
emotional or nervous breakdown.
Robinson suffered a similar breakdown
episode on April 30, 1986, which required
immediate hospitalization that lasted until
May 12. During this time, Champlin paid
Robinson accumulated sick leave benefits. Dr.
Davidson, Robinson's treating physician,
wrote "Mike is able to return to work" on a
prescription form dated May 19. On May 21,
Robinson's supervisor received a copy of a
May 19 hospital disoharge report in which
Davidson diagnosed symptoms of paranoia
attributed to intermittent use of and withdrawal from marijuana about a month earlier,
coupled with an underlying manic depressive
disease. Davidson prescribed Lithium and
Haldol as treatment for the mental illness and
suggested that, before Robinson returned to
his job, he should be "given an opportunity to
work in an environment where his job performance [could] be evaluated by someone else."
Champlin, upon receipt of the discharge
report, immediately notified Robinson that he
might be suspended. On May 28, he received a
termination letter that referred to Davidson's
note and report and then stated, "Since you
are unable to return to work, without limitation, we regretfully must terminate your
employment as of the end of your paid sick
leave, May 24, 1986."
Our review of the application of the law to
the pertinent facts in this case falls under the
"intermediate" standard of review, under,
which we must determine whether it is within
the limits of reasonableness and rationality.
Young v. Board of Review, 731 P.2d 480, 482
(Utah 1986); Board of Educ. of Sevier County
v. Board of Review, 701 P.2d 1064, 1067
(Utah 1985); Kehl v. Board of Review, 700
P.2d 1129, 1133 (Utah 1985); City of Orem v.
Christensen, 682 P.2d 292, 293 (Utah 1984). See
Utah Dept. of Admin. Servs. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 610 (Utah
1983). We must affirm the Board's determi-

Champlin Petroleum Company has petitioned this Court for a writ of review challenging a decision of the Industrial Commission's
Board of Review. The Board affirmed an
administrative law judge's holding that
Michael D. Robinson was entitled to unemployment benefits because he was not discharged from his employment for just cause
under the Employment Security Act, Utah
Code Ann. §35-4-5(b)(l) (1987). Champlin
was, accordingly, held liable for the benefit
charges in connection with Robinson's claim.
We affirm the Board of Review's decision.
•The following basic facts are not disputed
by the parties:
Champlin Petroleum
Company
("Champlin") took over operation of the Pine
View natural gas processing plant in Summit
County, Utah, from American Quasar in April
of 1985. Robinson, a gas plant operator for
American Quasar, was retained in that posiFor complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code • Co*s Annotation Service

§30-3-5. U.C.A.
Disposition of property - Maintenance
parties and children - Court to
jurisdiction - Custody and visitation
alimony - Nonmeritorious petition for
(1)
include

and healthcare of
have continuing
- Termination of
modification.

When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may
in

it

equitable

property, and parties.

orders

relating

to

the

children,

The Court shall include the following in

every decree of divorce:
(a)

an order assigning responsibility for the payment

of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of
the dependent children; and
(b)

if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an

order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate
health, hospital, and dental care insurance to the dependent
children.
(2)

The court may include, in an order determining child

support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a
portion

of

child

care

expenses

incurred

on

behalf

of

the

dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of
the

custodial

circumstances

parent.

If

are appropriate

the
and

court

determines

that the dependent

that

the

children

would be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing
the

non-custodial

parent

to

provide

the

day

care

for

the

dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of
the custodial parent,
(3)

The

court

has

continuing

jurisdiction

to

make

subsequent changes or new orders for the support and maintenance
of the parties, the custody of the children and their support,
maintenance, health, and dental care, or the distribution of the
property as is reasonable and necessary.
(4)

In

determing

visitation

rights

of

parents,

grandparents, and other relatives, the court shall consider the
welfare of the child.
(5)

Unless

a

decree

of

divorce

specifically

provides

otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a
former

spouse automatically

that former spouse.

terminates upon

the remarriage of

However, if the remarriage is annulled and

found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if
the

party

paying

alimony

is made

a party

to

the

action

of

annulment and his rights are determined.
(6)

Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a

former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying
alimony that the former spouse is residing with a person of the
opposite

sex.

However,

if

it

is

further

established

by

the

person receiving alimony that that relationship or association is
without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
(7)

When a petition for modification of child custody or

visitation provisions of a court order is made and denied, the

court may order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorney's
fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the
court determines that the petition was without merit and not
asserted in good faith.

